Believing is Knowing

Reading Mevakshei Panecha - Part 4 - Final - the Holy of Holies of a Person - Emunah.

2012-01-17T04:22:00.001-05:00

The last chapter of Mevakshei Panecha I found fascinating. It is entitled “The Holy of Holies of a Person” and it is a response to a Rav Sabato question to Rav Lichtenstein about faith. The first paragraph I believe is probably the most important one and really defines the idea of Emunah – faith – in a rational Jew.

“You want to talk about my Emunah in God? Is that what you want? That is the Holy of Holies of man! That is his Inner Sanctum! That is the most intimate of intimacies!”

We can talk about God, what we think He is, try to define him in words but ultimately we are just walking around a wall that can never be breached by an outsider. The paradox of Emunah is that we work and spend a lifetime searching for God in our surrounding but ultimately we find Him in the silence of the self. Rambam in MN 1:50 when he begins the chapters that discuss God’s attributes and how we can understand them without violating God’s unity (uniqueness) he introduces the subject with the following statement:

כאשר תפשוט מעליך את התאוות והמנהגים17 ותהיה בעל הבנה ותתבונן במה שאגיד בפרקים הבאים על שלילת התארים - תהיה לך בהכרח ודאות בעניין זה, אזי תהיה מאלה המציירים לעצמם18 את יִחוד השם ולא מאלה האומרים אותו בפיהם מבלי לציירו לעצמם19, שהללו בבחינת מי שנאמר עליהם: קרוב אתה בפיהם ורחוק מכִליותיהם (ירמיה י"ב, 2)19. אלא צריך אדם להיות בבחינת מי שמציירים להם את האמת ומשיגים אותה, אף אם אין הם מבטאים אותה, כמו שנצטוו אנשי המעלה ונאמר להם: אִמרו בלבבכם על משכבכם ודֹמו סלה (תהלים ד', 5)20.

Renounce desires and habits, follow your reason, and study what I am going to say in the chapters which follow on the rejection of the attributes; you will then be fully convinced of what we have said: you will be of those who truly conceive the Unity of God, not of those who utter it with their lips without thought, like men of whom it has been said, "Thou art near in their mouth, and far from their reins" (Jer. xii. 2). It is right that a man should belong to that class of men who have a conception of truth and understand it, though they do not speak of it. Thus the pious are advised and addressed, "Commune with your own heart upon your bed and be still. Selah." (Ps. iv. 5.)

Clearly Rav Lichtenstein has internalized Rambam’s admonition. A singular and unique entity which cannot be sensed with human senses, cannot be conceived with human mind, can only be intuited through inductive and deductive reasoning, such an entity cannot be verbalized outside the self, and that is true Emunah. Contemplating this brings us to an understanding of Negative Knowledge which is the key of Rambam’s thought in this matter. See my article here .

Rav Lichtenstein then proceeds to discuss the subject in a general without getting into specifics. First he addresses a well-known thought that I grew up with and always made me uncomfortable.

“Rav Elhanan Wasserman said that faith [in God] is simple and easy. However the Yetzer Hara interferes and keeps man from worshipping God. I do not accept these words. Firstly, to my mind, that is factually untrue. Secondly, this argument is somewhat insulting. It argues that were it not for bad urges, others too would aspire to faith. True that our natural senses may bring a person to believe, but to argue that it is easy and simple, were it not for our urges, I cannot agree with that. A certain effort is required for one to arrive at belief. The concept of faith is complex. Specifically, one cannot give one answer that one can say with certainty that it will convince every denier.”

Rav Lichtenstein makes two points that always bothered me about Rav Elhanan’s approach. He says that Emunah is self-evident. If it were so why does every thinking person struggle with it? He also accuses those who don’t accept it succumb to their bad urges. We know many ethical and moral people who have no Emunah.

“When I teach a Sugya –subject - and offer two possibilities as potential explanations, I tell my students, don’t forget that there also is a third possibility; both explanations are correct. Not always must we accept one position and refute the other. In Halachik sugyot it is possible that the resolution depends on circumstances. At times we will rely on one principle and others on another. So too with Emunah one cannot say that it all depends on one argument only. There different perspectives; from a historical and national one I find myself turning to a certain aspect of my personality while for other perspectives I turn to others.”

Rav Lichtenstein then spells out some of what I would term conflicting perspectives. We have to accept that certain truths and arguments that were considered axiomatic during the Middle Ages are no longer applicable. On the other hand reliance on subjective experiences does not work for many and triggers many questions.

“The historical perspective has two sides to it. Some people are inspired by it and it strengthens their Emunah while to others the historical perspective itself is the source of doubt. To anything you tell them they find analogies elsewhere, in the Caribbean or Antarctica. Of course the strongest historical proof is the contemplation of Jewish history and the wondrous survival of the Jewish nation against all odds, one lamb amongst seventy wolves. That strengthens one’s Emunah. The impetus for religious Emunah is multi-faceted; learning Torah, relying on the Tradition of generations, contemplation of the universe and its perfection, the Historical record and the personal instinct and experience. I hope that we don’t have to choose amongst these. I believe that they are all interdependent each supporting the other. In such a setup, some things are more central and important than others but altogether they lead us to experience Emunah without us having to choose one over the other.”

Rav Lichtenstein is talking about Emunah very generally without specifying a particular question or particular subject of belief. During the Middle Ages, basing themselves on the science of the times, the Rishonim felt that certain issues of belief can be proven scientifically while others were based on what I refer to as “plausibility” when taking into account all aspects of an issue. Rambam in MN spends several chapters in the beginning of Part 2 differentiating between the different types of arguments for the existence of God and His unity which he bases on what he considered as scientifically objective arguments while will, creation from nothingness and prophecy are based on plausibility rather than irrefutable proofs. Plausibility is based on a combination of various related propositions that support a certain point of view. This approach is used in matters that are beyond human comprehension, areas that humans cannot experience with their senses and is generally referred to as metaphysical questions. Considering the current state of scientific knowledge, Rav Lichtenstein seems to use the latter argument, the argument from plausibility as the basis for his understanding of Emunah. He also emphasizes that the process of searching, learning and contemplating these issues brings one closer to HKBH and ultimately Emunah becomes a combination of the rational and the experiential – the experiential being internalized and personal which does not lend itself to verbalization.

I highly recommend for anyone that has the fortitude and facility with the Hebrew language, to work his way through this very interesting, challenging and enlightening book. We need to take advantage and appreciate the few great talmidei Chachamim and thinkers in our community – and unfortunately they are few and precious.

In Memory of My Mother A’H who’s Yahrzeit is today the 22^nd of Tevet.

Reading Mevakshei Panecha - Part 3 - Leadership For Our Community.

2012-01-09T04:44:00.001-05:00

Continuing with the interview of Rav Lichtenstein in Mevakshei Panecha, Rav Sabato asks him about leadership as part of a general discussion about educating Talmidei Chachamim:

“This question, whether a Talmid Chacham should grow exclusively in Torah or should he also be involved in leadership matters, is a difficult question in our generation. Look at Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach ZL; there is no other in our generation like him. It will take a long time until we find another such great. One of the things that were outstanding about him was that although he expressed himself here and there about communal issues, he refused to be involved in leadership issues. I had many conversations with him about a variety of issues and he used to tell me: I don’t want to deal with this. On the other hand there are other Gedolim in Torah who took upon themselves this responsibility because of how important it was to them. If Rav Shlomo Zalman is one kind of figure amongst Gedolim, Rav Elayashiv is completely a different kind.

It is clear that we need great people but there is a great distance between being a great man (Gadol) and a leader. In great measure in the Chareidi world, notwithstanding all the due respect and appreciation for what they accomplish in the field of learning, those who become the heads of the community, don’t know the world around them and that is no coincidence as they are trained not to. They are taught that there is no point in dealing with anything that does not enter the world of the Beit Hamidrash and then they expect these same people who were taught not to notice their surroundings to become leaders? They should tell us how to behave [in the world outside]? No wonder that in our era this road is strewn with failure!

If one devotes time, significant time, dealing with external matters one gets to know reality, and knowing reality does not mean knowing the gizzard of a chicken for the purpose of ruling Hilchot treifot. It means to know in depth the soul of the nation, the community. I believe that they say in the name of the Chazon Ish that in the area of psak there is a greater risk of improperly understanding the circumstances of the case than in misreading the Halacha. (Rav Sabato points to Iggrot Chazon Ish letter 31). For many there is not enough understanding of what it means to know reality. They look at technical areas, one learning about electricity another about medicine. Of course one cannot rule certain halachot in Hilchot Shabbat without knowing a little physics, medicine etc… but this is far from enough. To deal with issues of values, those things that are on the agenda of the community, those issues that engage the community, one has to arrive to a certain depth in understanding the psyche of the individual, the nation and that requires investment, significant investment. The truth is that it is hard to see on the horizon personalities that will become such people in the future. I do not see a Rav Shlomo Zalman sprouting here [in Eretz Israel]. While in the Lakewood Yeshiva, with all the investment that is there and with all its glory, it is hard for me to see a new Rav Aharon Kotler coming out of there. They are around several decades and so far one has not emerged.

It is possible that it is our fate to get used to a different kind of leadership and preparation for leadership. This getting used to is difficult. Who does not want a leader like the Chafetz Chaim?

I do not see in our own group anyone like the Rav ZL. There are many Talmidei Chachamim who are Lamdanim with breadth and depth but a leader par excellence is missing….”

Rav Aharon Lichtenstein makes an interesting point about leadership in our community. He does not belittle the advantages of Torah leadership but it has to be someone prepared for the task by being deeply involved in real life outside the Beit Hamidrash. He does not subscribe to the school that believes that a lifelong Torah scholar somehow miraculously gains insights into the workings of the community and world outside. The required external involvement may come at the cost of some Talmud Torah but it is necessary and only then can we rely on such a leader. It is interesting that he does not see this kind of leadership emerging in any of the groups that make up the community of observant Jews. He does not however address enough the underlying causes for the lack of this type of leadership. By including his own group, who are active in the world outside the Beit Hamidrash, amongst those lacking the necessary leadership traits, he leaves us with a sense of helplessness and even despair.

Reading Mevakshei Panecha - Part 2 - How Should Religious Jews Relate To Secular Ones?

2012-01-02T11:40:00.000-05:00

In another chapter of the book Mevakshei Panecha, Rav Lichtenstein and Rav Sabato discuss the attitude religious Jews should have towards secular Jews. This issue is very pertinent today, especially with the painful and disturbing occurrences we read and hear about in Bet Shemesh and earlier in Jerusalem. Rav Sabato introduces the subject, presenting the two dominant points of view, that of Rav Kook and the Chazon Ish that seem to be the most accepted opinions in the religious community. Rav Kook holds that considering that the secular Jews were the leaders of the Zionistic enterprise and the builders of the land, they apparently were suffused with a national spirit of love and dedication to their fellow Jews. Such a total dedication to the Jewish nation stems from a deep-rooted Jewishness that is implanted in their soul. These traits will eventually blossom as the process of return to Zion continues and eventually move towards Torah study and Mitzvot. The second position is that of the Chazon Ish (not necessarily contradictory) that the secular Jews are “Tinokot Shenishbu” prisoners of their circumstances, and therefore cannot be blamed for their misguided ways. Rav Lichtenstein disagrees with both approaches.

“In both narratives there is a certain judgment, a certain statement of fact, a general categorization of the public in question. I have no idea how one can think in such a way. We are talking about a large public. The spiritual content and the values of a part of that public include powerful ideas, important ones that contain meaningful values, not necessarily historical ones. At the same time, to our great sorrow, there is a part of that public that is empty and frivolous, who shook off not only Torah and Mitzvot, Mikvah or Kashrut, but also values that are important to us as Jews and others that are universal… Therefore, I don’t want to pass judgment on the whole lifestyle of that public, nor do I think that I can… If we want to judge a certain individual within a certain public, there are things that irritate us, but there are also certain things that definitely are attainments and values that I wish we were at their level… If we relate to them as Tinokot Shenishbu we do not give them any credit, we don’t find anything of value worth emulating, we assume that they have no meaningful spiritual or moral value, as the [famous] definition by the Chazon Ish [comparing them] to an empty wagon. To say that they are an “empty wagon” infers that they don’t have anything of value, nothing that is not better in our community. I believe that in actuality that is incorrect and I am not interested in going to that place.”

Rav Lichtenstein explains that the totally negative image that we have of the secular community is a result of our defending against being drawn in by them.

“I repeat: I don’t believe that is the reality. There are amongst them very charitable people, people who care deeply for the future, the path and the survival of the Jewish community – at the communal level not only the national. My vision is not theirs. But there are many things that they are building and doing, not only in the areas of state where they have a historical role which is the perspective of Rav Kook, they also have value systems that are meaningful. Saying that they are Tinokot Shenishbu is infantilizing this public. Saying they are Tinokot Shenishbu is saying that they have no value but it is “nebbish” not their fault. I have no doubt that there are such people amongst them just as there are also amongst us… I also see an element of Tinokot Shenishbu in the Rav Kook approach not only in the Chazon Ish one. I am referring to his attitude to the secular group that says: you think that you are such and such, but we know that deep inside you there is another universe. That universe is your real internal self. One day that self will be uncovered, as you remove layer after layer of skin. They see this as layers of an onion. This attitude is arrogant. I would object if I was the subject of this attitude and I don’t believe one should relate to them in this way.”

Rav Lichtenstein very astutely puts his finger on one of the least attractive aspects of the religious view of the other. There is a sense of self satisfaction, a feeling that I am doing what is right while the other, who does not follow the Mitzvot, is missing out on this great good and the only reason they are doing so is because of ignorance. Of course, this attitude does not promote feelings of mutual respect and good will. Rav Lichtenstein blames or rather tries to mitigate the accusation of arrogance by blaming it on self-preservation. There is no question that it plays a role but ultimately it puts down anyone that is different. It also refuses to see much of the good and values of the other which at times is superior to those found in our community. I was watching a video a few days ago where one of the crazies in Beit Shemesh was yelling at the police and the journalists saying to them “you are going to teach us values? You?” Of course this guy was nuts and abhorrent but crazy people sometimes voice what others in his community think. Indeed, many of the reactions of the rabbinical organs e.g. Agudah, condemned the public behavior but not the underlying arrogance and dismissal of the other.

“The vision of Rav Kook I understand. At times I am even jealous of him. At times. The vision he expresses, I have problems with to a great extent, because I see in it – and I hope I don’t misread – a preference of the historical over the moral. This vision praises the attainments and the mission that these people fulfill in the physical world; but what about [their accomplishments in] the intellectual realm?”

Rav Lichtenstein is critical of Rav Kook’s approach because he understands that he refuses to see the good values that the secular community brings to the table. Rav Kook sees them as tools in the hand of HKBH to serve the Klal but does not give them credit for what they really offer in terms of the intellectual and spiritual.

So what is Rav Lichtenstein’s own position?

“It is very important that we do not under any circumstances arrive at the conclusion that we have no regard to select values that exist in segments of the secular public. There are people in the religious community, and not only in the religious one, that have an attitude of - either you are [totally] with us or against us. I believe that a Jewish moral perspective based on torah should recognize imperfect value systems too. If I am out to build an ideology, whether a personal one or for a community, I build it on a purely Holy basis. On the other hand, if I ask myself: let us say that this person, this group or that group, are anyway not keeping Shabbat, they don’t go to the Mikvah, is there no difference from our perspective - not from theirs - if a Jew hates Torah or loves it, or whether he has a warm spot for it, even if this is not enough to make him observe the Shulchan Aruch? … Every one of us has had the experience that when a member of the family becomes non-observant, at times there are confrontations. What is the point of the confrontation? People have family members who they know will not return to become Shabbos observant halachikally, it is however important to us that they should have a warm spot in their heart [for torah] not only so that should they become members of the Knesset they will vote favorably for women serving in Sherut Leumi [instead of the army – DG] but because we pray and wish that our whole community remain healthy both spiritually and physically and that includes regard for select values.”

Rav Lichtenstein makes here a very important point. We all have a tendency to look at others from the perspective of our own values. Anybody that sees things differently is judged on that basis. We see our own values as ideal and look askance at values that we do not have. That prevents us from objectively evaluating and adapting some of these values, those that are meaningful and important. Our attitude further creates a rift between us and the secular public which prevents them from appreciating what we bring to the table. We have to look at ourselves as a whole, the religious and secular community as one, and respect the values found in both communities. The risk to this approach is that we see all values as relative rather than absolute.

“However, I do not agree with some of my colleagues who say: “listen, not everybody is perfect. We are not mindful of this and they are not mindful of something else. They don’t keep Shabbat and we are lax in other things. I do not buy this approach. True, we all are not perfect, but what is missing, how much is missing and are the attempts to fix our shortcomings sincere? That is a much more meaningful [criteria].”

There are indeed Jewish values that are important to us. The external values are meaningful but are even more so if added to our own values rather than replacing them. In other words, Rav Lichtenstein does not want us to misunderstand that his appreciation for external values should allow for them to replace our own values. They are a welcome and necessary addition and they will only be available to us if we look at them objectively and with the due respect.

“This approach to a partial value system is not exclusive to our relationship with the secular community. It is also useful in our relationship with the Conservative and Reform movements everywhere. And I repeat over and over, I value very much the incomplete value system and hope and pray that I can advance with people towards the goal of their internalizing more and more of the world of our values”.

In other words Rav Lichtenstein sees great value in the cross-pollination of the different value systems in the Jewish community. To allow for that to happen both communities have to show respect for each other although in the eyes of each the value system of the other is incomplete and imperfect. An all or nothing approach is not constructive for both parties.

Reading Mevakshei Panecha - Part 1 - Secular Knowledge and The Torah Jew

2011-12-27T20:06:00.003-05:00

My Israeli friend Mechel recently gave me as a gift the book Mevakshei Panecha, an interview of Rav Aharon Lichtenstein by Rav Chaim Sabato. It is not an easy read although Rav Sabato is a writer par excellence. Rav Lichtenstein has developed the dialectical method to an art form and some chapters leave the reader in a state of confusion – at least that was the case with me. The effort to read is however well worth it as we get a glimpse of the workings of a great mind and a Gadol Betorah, one of the greatest of our time. I am about half way through the book and I want to share/discuss some points that I found enlightening and interesting. As the book is in Hebrew, I will translate the pertinent excerpts.

In a chapter discussing how to relate to values that come to us from outside the Torah:

“There are people including gentiles whose historical mission is one of creativity – literary or moral creativity. These are people that you see in them greatness whether greatness of the soul or moral greatness. How can one not be impressed with Samuel Johnson ? A man who started life in the London gutter and climbed to a level of Gemilat Chassadim that I wish I could reach. Should I ignore this just because he was a gentile? …. What nobility, what fear of heaven and dedication are projected and the final lines of the wondrous sonata of Milton regarding his blindness! Why should I ignore this?”

We are not talking about TIDE (Torah im Derech Eretz) which is generally seen as a utilitarian approach to secular studies but rather a fundamental appreciation of that knowledge and the creativity found in that world. An appreciation that sees it as part of the basic education needed to make us into perfected human beings and Jews. However Rav Lichtenstein does set some limitations.

“One has to differentiate between the ideal and the practical. In practice, one must be careful when importing values from the outside by looking at two issues. One issue is self-suspicion. When I am searching for values outside the Torah I must ask myself: what propels me to look for universal values? Why am I not looking for them in our own sources? Am I truly looking? Is the search occurring only after I have fully evaluated everything that is written in the Torah about these values without finding them, to the point of having to look outside? Is there another reason that I am compelled to look in places other than the Torah? … The second issue one must investigate is where these external values come from. Are they possibly coming from sources that from our standpoint are unreliable and unwanted? Having concluded these two analyses I find myself confronting a universal question and not necessarily a Jewish one. It is told that the Caliph Omar Ibn Hatab, one of the famous Caliphs in the middle Ages ordered the burning of the famous great library in Alexandria. He argued that if what is written in this library is true it must be found in the Koran and if it is not found there it must be false…”

Rav Lichtenstein subtly points out that the standard Yeshiva world argument that anything not found in the Torah must be false is an old argument developed by other religions. As he points out further this argument was quite common in 17^th century England between the Puritans and their more enlightened opponents. Rav Lichtenstein then fleshes out the immediate questions one has to confront when going out to look for external values. First we have to determine how well grounded the person that embarks on the search is. Is he easily swayed or is he self-confident and has a firm footing in his thinking?

“We then have to focus on two additional issues. One is the environment the person is in. When I say environment I refer to two things. First is to analyze the social, financial and cultural environments. The whole environment could be so different from what it once was, that the sources do not address the current situation. We have to however caution; the fact that the circumstances changed does not mean that one has to automatically expect a changed stand. Not every circumstantial change forces us to modify our thinking or outlook. But we must at least be aware of the changed circumstances. I always ask myself whether the situation I am in now is a mirror of the situation and circumstances that is presented in the words of Chazal and the Rishonim. Second, even if the environment has not changed, I have to ask are the tools that I have now different than those that were available to the past. And even if there is no change in either the circumstances or the tools, sometimes there is a change in the weltanschauung that I have to things, which may not be exactly the same it was once….”

Rav Lichtenstein is very sensitive to the changes that have occurred over time and the effect they have on how we look at them from the Torah viewpoint. We cannot let the Torah viewpoint become ossified to the point of making it irrelevant. Rav Sabato asks him if his father in law, RYBS Z”L was influenced by external sources.

“A certain person once asked me if Rav Soloveitchik was influenced by Kierkegaard. I understand that one who asks this question does so with a critical undertone, as if saying that should the Rav have been influenced by Kierkegaard, woe is to us! I answered him that if the question was whether the Rav read Kierkegaard, of course he did! But if the question was did he take anything from him? I don’t know for sure but I suspect the answer is positive too. Of course, a great person like the Rav, who learned Torah all his life, who is rooted in its world, its opinions and its values – such a person when he is confronted by a book by Kierkegaard, if after a careful inspection he discovers that the things he read in there are true, moral and deepen our understanding of divine worship, does he have to ignore them? Does he have to turn away from them? Why? Just because they are based on Kierkegaard? If the notion is true, he will take it and if not he will ignore it, not because it comes from Kierkegaard but because it is wrong... There is a problem that many people nowadays have, including Yeshiva students. They lack the ability to dive into stormy seas. They live in a world of fear. They are afraid of everything. A part of the Yeshiva world suffers from this disability. True, in some matters they are right, but in many other things, and not necessarily literary matters, they are not right…”

Rav Lichtenstein interestingly starts the discussion by setting very clear parameters. One has to analyze and be suspicious of one’s motives. We first have to explore the whole Torah and try to find an answer to the existential question that is intriguing the searcher. He then admits that there are contemporary matters and issues that because of the environment, the culture, the tools we now have, cannot be solved by ignoring external sources. And then he turns to the Rav and how he did take out good ideas from secular culture and introduced them into Judaism. The way I read the progression of his thought is that people of the caliber of the Rav are able to independently fish in the deep waters of secular thought and find the kernels of truth that advance the thinking of a modern Jew living in our world today. He does not say it, but it is clear that he sees himself as capable of doing the same. Lesser scholars and other interested students can then study their insights which help them navigate the contemporary cultural currents. The Yeshivot are so afraid of possible deviance that they prohibit even that, thus restricting their members from fully participating in the contemporary world. As we will see further, this respect for truth from whatever its source leads Rav Lichtenstein to a unique and extremely enlightening perspective on the secular Jews of our time. I will write about that in an upcoming post.

Reb Zadok on Attribution -

2011-12-04T18:28:00.002-05:00

Several years ago I read an article which referred to an interesting approach by Reb Zadok Hacohen of Lublin regarding attribution. At the time I was lazy to look it up and promptly forgot where I had seen the quote and of course could not find in the writings of Reb Zadok. This Shabbat I read an article by Professor Moshe Halamish and lo and behold there is the quote again. This time I went to the source and looked it up. It is quite interesting so I decided to translate it and post it. It is in Sefer Hazichronot page 68a in a discussion regarding the different trends in kabbalah. Reb Zadok explains that Kabbalistic insights cannot be developed solely through rational processes. Reb Zadok then continues to explain how these metaphysical insights are acquired intuitively and through deep contemplation by certain perfected individuals.

“For this apprehension is an emanation from above to prophets through prophetic processes and to sages through Ruach Hakodesh, each apprehending according to the status of his knowledge, apprehension and personal perfection. Moshe rabbeinu in his vision of the burning bush first and his later vision when God passed all His goodness in front of him, was shown God’s true unity. However, unlike Yechezkel he did not see the chariots, the Chayot and the Ofanim; he had other visualizations according to his status…. These different visualizations varied according to each sage amongst them Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai [the protagonist of the Zohar] whose visualizations varied at different times. So too in the Sefer Habahir attributed to rabbi Nechunya ben Hakana, and Sefer Hatemunah, attributed to rabbi Ishmael the High priest, other visualizations are found where they speak in a completely different vein. So too the kabbalah of the Geonim that we find in the Pardes and other holy books, a selection of which is reprinted in a small sefer named “Selection of Kabbalah from Geonim” (Warsaw edition), a reader may notice that it is a totally different approach to kabbalah then what is found in Sefer Hazohar and its companions. That is so because it is based on the vision that was experienced by one of the Geonim, the head of their school …. There is also is printed a sefer Mayan Hachochma that is attributed to Moshe rabbeinu which is also quoted in Pardes, Pelach Harimon, in the introduction to Sefer Emek Hamelech and others. It appears to me that it is accepted by the earlier sages that it is a holy book and it seems to me that it was written in the days of the later Geonim or close to that time by one holy person who through his Ruach Hakodesh was able to apprehend what Moshe rabbeinu did receive from Sinai (!) for a Chacham is greater than a prophet as Ramban in Baba Batra 12a writes see there as quoted in Ayin Yaakov. The beginning of that sefer is already found in sefer Haiyun by Rav Chamai Gaon parts of which is printed in the above mentioned Selection. It is also mentioned in sefer Hakana etc… It seems to me that Sefer Haiyun was in front of the author of sefer Mayan Hachochma and he followed along the same path a little though we find many additional novel things that he apprehended during his own contemplation. For those who visualize the Chariot do it via Ruach Hakodesh gained through knowledge and rational thought, which is however supplemented by superhuman apprehension emanating from above through Ruach Hakodesh as explained by Ramban… ”

Reb Zadok is referring to Ramban who explains the Gemara that Nevuah no longer exists, as limiting it to prophetic visions however Ruach Hakodesh that accompanies knowledge of great sages still continues to exist. Reb Zadok explains that to be a supplemental insight that emanates from HKBH and that is Ruach Hakodesh. I have attached a scan of the pertinent page in the original Sefer Hazichronot.

This is a fascinating concept developed by a Chassidic Rebbe who was also a great scholar and thinker and who had a very keenly developed critical sense. He discerns the different schools of Kabbalistic thought. The amazing thing is that he understands that Kabbalah is a personal experience rather than something that is transmitted. There seems to be a basic philosophical thinking that goes back to antiquity but is reinterpreted by each visionary according to his personal state of mind and thinking. That tradition of personal intuition and insight seems to go back to the prophets all the way to Moshe rabbeinu. A sefer attributed to an earlier sage may be written by someone else at a later date and attributed to the earlier person if it supposedly was based on his thinking. Is that what happened to the Zohar? Was it Rav Moshe de Leon’s insights according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai? Reb Zadok does not say so but can we infer so from his way of thinking?

Circumcision and Child Sacrifice - Some Fascinating Parallels.

2011-11-14T18:40:00.001-05:00

In 2006 (scary! my blog is over 5 years old) I posted this re the Akeida and it generated quite a few interesting comments at the time. To my surprise and I have to admit satisfaction my old posts are read and relevant five years later as I received a thoughtful email commenting on it. The comment triggered some further thoughts on the subject and here they are.

In the earlier post I explained my understanding of Rambam that Avraham was having internal debates about his dedication to God. The question that I did not address is why did his introspection lead to a vision that manifested a human sacrifice? The same thinking could have found other visions that are less jarring that would demonstrate his devotion. Apparently, the idea of sacrificing a child, especially a first born, was very much the custom of the time and that is where Avraham got this idea in his vision. Neviim are realists who live within their time and culture and their vision is formed by that reality.

To expand on this theme - the haftorah to this week’s Parsha is the story in Melachim 2:4 about the Shunamit woman who was helped by Elisha and gave birth to a son whom she almost lost later - a similar theme to Abraham's experience with Yitzchak. That is usually the case with Haftorot; they have some connection to the Parsha that is read before it. What most people miss in our Haftorah is the shouting silence that is heard by what is not read - the end of the story just preceding this one, Melachim 2:3:26-27.

כו וַיַּרְא מֶלֶךְ מוֹאָב, כִּי-חָזַק מִמֶּנּוּ הַמִּלְחָמָה; וַיִּקַּח אוֹתוֹ שְׁבַע-מֵאוֹת אִישׁ שֹׁלֵף חֶרֶב, לְהַבְקִיעַ אֶל-מֶלֶךְ אֱדוֹם--וְלֹא יָכֹלוּ.

26 And when the king of Moab saw that the battle was too sore for him, he took with him seven hundred men that drew sword, to break through unto the king of Edom; but they could not.

כז וַיִּקַּח אֶת-בְּנוֹ הַבְּכוֹר אֲשֶׁר-יִמְלֹךְ תַּחְתָּיו, וַיַּעֲלֵהוּ עֹלָה עַל-הַחֹמָה, וַיְהִי קֶצֶף-גָּדוֹל, עַל-יִשְׂרָאֵל; וַיִּסְעוּ, מֵעָלָיו, וַיָּשֻׁבוּ, לָאָרֶץ. {פ}

27 Then he took his eldest son that should have reigned in his stead, and offered him for a burnt-offering upon the wall. And there came great wrath upon Israel; and they departed from him, and returned to their own land. {P}

The rabbis, quoted ad locum by Rashi and Redak explain that the King of Moab asked his advisers, what merits Israel has, that it deserves such miracles which help them in battle. His advisers told him that their forefather Abraham offered his firstborn as a sacrifice when God asked him to do so. The king of Moab therefore did the same and sacrificed his own firstborn. God was angry because it contrasted the devotion that this man had to his god with Israel’s lack of the same as Israel was sacrificing their sons to strange gods which their own God forbade. The rabbis clearly connected the two – the popular custom of child sacrifice and the Akeida. Although it is very much the theme of the Parsha, the Haftorah starts immediately after these verses, skipping them because of God's wrath but the elephant is in the room for one who knows Tanach or bothers to look up the Haftorah in a Tanach.

There is a further connection of child sacrifice to the Mitzvah of Brit Milah. It is quite plausible that one of the reasons[1] for the Mitzvah of Milah is that it was meant as a replacement for human sacrifice, letting blood instead of killing the child. Symbolically the bloodletting is performed on the organ that is responsible for reproduction and future generations - that which this sacrifice, if it had been performed was precluding. In fact, the story of the birth of Yitzchak and subsequently the Akeida follow the instructions Avraham received about the Brit Milah. The Torah is telling us that after the commandment of Milah, child sacrifice has no place in religion. The Mitzvah of Mila that is performed at birth replaces it and if additional manifestations of devotion to God are needed, replace a human sacrifice with one of animals – the ram being a symbol for Korbanot.

The Bracha we make during the Brit Mila is (MT Hilchot Mila 3:3):

ואחר כך מברך אבי הבן, או המל, או אחד מן העומדין שם ברכה זו--ברוך אתה ה' אלוהינו מלך העולם, אשר קידש ידיד מבטן, וחוק בשארו שם, וצאצאיו חתם באות ברית קודש

The words קידש ידיד מבטן, are quite possibly a reference to the ancient cultural custom of child sacrifice. I heard this suggestion close to 30 years ago by Professor Haim Gevaryahu at the Brit Milah of one of his grandsons. I subsequently found it online with an attribution to him by his son Gilad Gevaryahu with a reference to the source for this conjecture.

Philo of Byblos (64-141 A.D.) described a ritual in Canaanite religion as follows:

Among ancient peoples in critically dangerous situations it

was customary for the rulers of a city or nation, rather than

lose everyone, to give over the dearest of their children as a

propitiatory sacrifice to the avenging deities. The children

thus given up were slaughtered according to a secret ritual.

Now Kronos, whom the Phoenicians call El, who was king of

their land and who was later divinized––after his death––as

the star of Kronos, had an only son by a local bride named

Anobret (and therefore they called him Yedid1; even now

among the Phoenicians the only son is given this name); when

war’s gravest danger gripped the land, he [Kronos] dressed

his son in royal attire, prepared an altar, and sacrificed him.

(Harold W. Attridge and Robert A. Oden, Jr., Philo of Byblos

The Phoenician Histroy: Introduction, Critical Text, Notes.

Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series 9. Washington,

D. C.: Catholic Biblical Association, 1981: 61–62.)

See also a post I wrote a few years ago.

[1] BTW Rambam in MN offers three and one more can be found in MT.

Rav Gedalia Nadel Z"L on the Rule of the Majority.

2011-11-11T06:19:00.001-05:00

As I am learning Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot with my chavruta and we are reaching the chapters that deal generally with Ta’aruvot, mixtures of forbidden and permitted foods, we decided to go over a shiur that Rav Gedaliah Nadel (RGN) gave in Kolel Chazon Ish on the subject of Rove – the rule of the majority. The shiur is printed in Rav Shailat’s Betorato Shel Rav Gedaliah and was approved by him. We found it to be very helpful. I will present here in my own words my understanding of his approach. I think it is important to see how a real original Torah thinker deals with a complex subject and I am hoping that I will learn something myself working through the issue this way.

There is an accepted basic general rule in cases of mixtures of forbidden and permitted foods, Issur and Heter that according to torah law (de’oraita) the minority is subsumed by the majority - -

מדאורייתא ברובא בטיל (TB Chulin 98b) . The rule (Bitul henceforth) has many detailed variations and arguments among the rabbis as to its application, whether it applies to all mixtures, whether they are of the same type of food or also when two different types are mixed together, does it apply to both dry with dry and wet with wet (liquids) mixtures and so on. The idea behind this rule is, as explained by Rosh (Chulin chapter 7 letter 37) that although when a mixture of Issur and Heter occurs, for example one piece of unslaughtered meat among two kosher pieces, we know that the forbidden meat is present and logically we would say that when one picks one piece to eat there is a possibility that it is the forbidden one and considering that neveila is an Issur Torah, a safek (when the Issur is not known) would be prohibited. The Torah however tells us (Gezeirat Hakatuv) that we consider it as if the Issur became Heter and we can even eat the whole mixture. In other words not only are we allowed to eat each piece on its own, but we may even eat the whole all at once (e.g. eat all the pieces) where the prohibited is necessarily also consumed.

The question is what is the source of this rule? If it is a Gezeirat Hakatuv where is it found in the Torah? Rashi in Chulin says that it is based on the verse in Shemot 23:2

לֹא-תִהְיֶה אַחֲרֵי-רַבִּים, לְרָעֹת; וְלֹא-תַעֲנֶה עַל-רִב, לִנְטֹת אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים--לְהַטֹּת.

Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil; neither shalt thou bear witness in a cause to turn aside after a multitude to pervert justice;

I will not go here into a discussion about the plain meaning of the verse versus the Midrash; suffice it to say that the Rabbis read the last three words אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים—לְהַטֹּת as telling a court, a Beit Din to decide according to the majority rule (see the first Mishnah in Sanhedrin 2a). Rashi is telling us that the rule that we follow the majority in a court ruling can be extended to Bitul. But where is the similarity? A court is trying to determine the truth. There is only one truth and the Torah tells us that we must accept the truth as seen by the majority. The other opinion is therefore not the truth; it is wrong, null and void and therefore non-existent. In a mixture, the prohibited food remains there though only in a minority, but it is present in some quantity. How does the unslaughtered meat become slaughtered meat? More surprising yet, is that we do not find this comparison in the Gemara. It is only the Rishonim who develop this comparison between courts and food mixtures. The Rosh as we saw sees this as a Gezeirat Hakatuv which traditionally is understood to be a rule that does not necessarily have a rational explanation. Had the Rabbis in the Talmud told us that it is so we would have been forced to accept it and assume that it is a tradition going back to Moshe, but how can Rishonim develop an irrational comparison?

There is a Gemara that, at first blush, seems to tie the rule of majority in courts to other Halachik situations of Rove. The Gemara in Chulin 11a says:

מנא הא מילתא דאמור רבנן זיל בתר רובא מנלן דכתיב (שמות כג) אחרי רבים להטות רובא דאיתא קמן כגון ט' חנויות וסנהדרין לא קא מיבעיא לן כי קא מיבעיא לן רובא דליתיה קמן כגון קטן וקטנה מנלן

- What is the source of the rabbi’s rule: follow the majority?
- You are asking for the source? Isn’t it written, follow the majority?
- I was not asking about a majority that is present e.g. nine stores and Sanhedrin. I was asking about a majority that is not in front us, e.g. Male and female minors.

The Gemara sees the case of majority rule in courts as comparable to the one of nine stores and therefore the latter can be deduced from the former. The comparison may be explained that when we accept the court’s majority rule it is because we assume that there is a strong probability that the opinion of the majority is correct and the contrary opinion is non-existent. So too, when there are nine stores selling Kosher meat and one Non-kosher and one finds meat in the street that must have come from one of the stores and is now in doubt from which store it came from, the probability is that it came from the nine and not the single non-kosher one. In either case probability works for the majority – he probably found Kosher food and so too the court majority ruled correctly. That is not so in the case of Bitul; we always have the forbidden mixed with the permissible. How do we deduce from the courts that the forbidden – which is still present – is seen as non-existent? We still have no good explanation how the case of Bitul can be compared to the court case.

Rabbi Chaim Brisker (Chidushei Hagrach LaShas – stencil – Baba Kama 27b) suggests that there is Bitul in the case of the Courts. The Torah requires that a Beit Din be composed of a certain number of people, three for monetary matters, twenty three for capital cases and so on. In a case of a disagreement, when we follow the majority, aren’t we deciding a ruling without the required minimum of Dayanim? The Torah however teaches that if the minimum members are present, even when they are not unanimous, they can still rule and the ruling is binding. That shows that the minority opinion is not seen as non-existent but rather as agreeing with the majority. In other words, we see the minority as being forced to adopt the opinion of the majority and now we have a unanimous ruling by the required minimum Dayanim. It is an ingenious suggestion but works only if we assume that there must be a minimum of, for example, 23 Dayanim deciding the case. We can also alternatively understand that the Torah requires a minimum of Dayanim deliberating a case and if a majority agrees they can then decide and rule according to that majority as long as 23 partook in the deliberations. Reb Chaim’s proofs from various sources, Tosafot in Baba Kama 27b and Sanhedrin 30a are not convincing. (RGN presents strong rebuttals which I will not discuss here).

In our discussion so far we have assumed that the reason for following the majority in the case of the courts and the nine stores is based on probability. This assumption needs to be reassessed.

1. We can demonstrate that the Gemara in Chulin 11a did not see it that way. The Gemara accepts the comparison of the nine store case to the courts but does not agree to compare the case of the male and female minors to it. The latter case is one of Yibum – levirate marriage – with the involvement of a minor. A brother’s wife is considered an Erva –intimate relationships are forbidden with her - even after the brother’s death. If however the couple had no children, there is a positive commandment for the surviving brother to marry the widow. The Mitzvah of Yibum supersedes the Issur Erva because, as the Torah explains, the brother is required to establish the deceased brother’s name – namely give him an heir. In the case that either the surviving brother is a minor or the widow is one, there is a possibility that either one will grow up sterile and thus will be unable to fulfill the intent of the law. We however do not worry about it and say that the majority of children do not grow up sterile and rely on the rule of following the majority. That being a probability why does the Gemara not accept it as similar to the majority rule of the court which we suggested is also based on probability? Why would relying on a probability of something occurring in the future רובא דליתיה קמן be less of a probability? It shows that the Gemara was on a different track and probability was not the reason for this rule and when the Gemara differentiated between a majority that is present and one that is not, some other principle was involved in its thinking. Should one suggest that the Gemara was basing its question on a Gezeirat Hakatuv, namely that we see the Torah uses the case of the courts to set down the rule of Rove and that is a majority that is present that would also negate the comparison to the nine stores. A Gezeirat Hakatuv which supposedly has no rationale should not allow for deductions and extrapolations. The rule would apply only to the case where it is used and nowhere else.

2. In the case of the nine stores, we described it as one finding a piece of meat in the street in a town where there are nine kosher butchers and one non-kosher one. It is only in that case that we follow Rove. In the case where one bought a piece of meat from one of the stores not knowing which store it was, the rule of rove does not apply and the meat is considered non-kosher. The basis of this ruling is a verse in Devarim 19::11

וְכִי-יִהְיֶה אִישׁ, שֹׂנֵא לְרֵעֵהוּ, וְאָרַב לוֹ וְקָם עָלָיו, וְהִכָּהוּ נֶפֶשׁ וָמֵת; וְנָס, אֶל-אַחַת הֶעָרִים הָאֵל.

The subject is the law of the sanctuary cities. The Torah allows for an accidental murderer to escape to one of those cities and remain safe from a vengeful relative of the victim. The Torah defines “accidental” and then adds a negative condition; should the murderer have lain in wait for his victim, he would not be eligible for sanctuary. That seems to be limiting what would be considered intentional murder to only when the murderer was lying in wait. One opinion is that it limits a case of someone throwing a rock into a group of ten people that contained one person who, if killed, the murderer would not get the death penalty. Even though the great majority of the people made the murderer eligible for the death penalty, that one ineligible one in the group saves him from that fate. The rule of Rove does not apply here because when the Rove is stationary we look at each individual as one of two (similar to the odds in dice) and therefore the exempting person is matched to each of the group individually. We now have an even possibility rather that Rove. The same applies to the nine stores in our case. If probability is the underlying basis for majority rule, how does it work here? How does this situation affect the probability of the murderer killing the one that exempts from death penalty rather than one of nine regular people? If again we would see this as a Gezeirat Hakatuv, how then can we extrapolate to the case of the nine stores and make it into a general rule that כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה?

3. The entire premise that the majority of the Dayanim is correct is questionable. A difference of opinion amongst Dayanim is usually subjective. The case that presents itself has many nuances and to decide which of the two petitioners is telling the truth or his perception of what really happened is correct depends on intuition and other non-objective analyses; attitude, demeanor, body language and so on. A majority does not have a better chance to get at the truth than the minority. There are cases too that can be decided either way based on the text and the rules of interpretation. (We find in Hilchot Mamrim 2:1 that a later supreme court may overturn the ruling of an earlier one based on their own interpretation. My addition DG). Clearly there is more than one truth. We must therefore conclude that the majority rule has nothing to do with the probability that they are correct. It is just a practical rule where decisions are required and we follow the majority right or wrong otherwise we would never arrive at a conclusion.

To answer the questions we presented, RGN introduces several what I consider revolutionary ideas and unique approaches of integrating Halacha, Philosophy and Psychology. RGN explains that the generally accepted idea that Gezeirat Hakatuv has no rationale is incorrect. When there are two or more ways to look at something, the Gezeirat Hakatuv, the Torah tells us the path to choose. Without the Torah we would be at a loss how to proceed as each path has its own logic. However, the path chosen by the Gezeirat Hakatuv itself, the choice it made, tells us what the thinking behind that choice is and we can use that rationale for other similar situations.

The idea behind the Gezeirat Hakatuv of following the majority is that when a person is confronted by a mixture, the majority is dominant and is seen as the totality. For example, if a field is green but has some minor patches of yellow, a person that looks at the field refers to it as a green field. A rice dish that has some vegetables mixed into it is referred to as a rice dish notwithstanding the other minority ingredients. This idea applies to all cases whether it is a court or a food mixture. It does not mean that the minority opinion in the case of a court is non-existent but rather the majority opinion that the court ruling follows is representative of this court. We see this in our day to day life too. The current Supreme Court is the Roberts court and its decisions are referred to as that court’s decision although there were dissenting opinions. The same applies in a mixture of permissible and forbidden foods. The forbidden food is there, in fact if more forbidden food falls into the mixture, enough for it to now constitutes a majority, the mixture becomes forbidden again – Chozer Veni’ur (see Rosh above a little further). But while the forbidden food is in the minority, we refer to the whole mixture as permissible. Without the Gezeirat Hakatuv we would consider every mixture as questionable, every court ruling that has dissenters as unresolved, and the rules of Safek would apply – De’oraita lechumra and Derabanan lekula. If the subject matter is a Torah prohibition we would act strictly while if a rabbinic rule leniently. The Gezeirat Hakatuv tells us to choose the side of the majority and act accordingly. We look at all “mixtures” as being uniform, whether it is a court with dissenters or a food mixture.

Now the two cases of the “nine stores” become clearer. When the piece of meat is found in the street, we look at all the town’s butchers from where this meat came from as one entity that is Kosher. The one store that is not kosher does not stand out in that whole. However, when a person doubts into which butcher store he entered to purchase, worrying that he might have bought it in the non-kosher one, we have two choices. We can look at the stores and see them as above or we can argue that when then person entered the store to buy meat, this store was a well-defined location that does not become one with the other store and therefore is not seen as one entity. The fact that he does not remember which store it was leaves the question open and the safek remains. It should therefore be treated as a Safek would. We therefore have the Gezeirat Hakatuv of, וְאָרַב לוֹ וְקָם עָלָיו, to teach us that indeed the second position is the Torah’s choice and it remains a Safek. There is a rationale for this choice and a very important one. A person who knows that there is a non-Kosher butcher amongst the town’s butchers is very much aware of that. This is very much on his mind. When a question develops in which store he purchased, a question mark will always remain in his mind. On the other hand when a piece of meat is found in the street, the whole focus is on this particular piece of meat. There is no awareness that it might be forbidden as most of the meat in town is kosher. Following the majority fits well with the persons perception. RGN explains, and to me this is the most important point, that Mitzvot are there to influence our behavior and our thinking. Human nature and perception therefore play a central role in how Halacha deals with all Mitzvot. There is no intrinsic Issur just as it relates to the self -control of the observant religious person. Permitting one to eat something that in his perception there still is doubt about its permissibility is counter-productive when self-control is the objective. Rav Sheilat in a note comments that RGN repeated this point in many of his shiurim.

Finally, the Gemara in Chulin that differentiates between the cases of the courts and the nine stores and on the other hand the case of Yibum of minors can also be understood with this reasoning. While the courts are seen as one entity and the decision ignores the dissenting minority, that is not so with the case of Yibum. The possibility of a minor becoming sterile is rare but that possibility is not part of a group or entity where the overwhelming majority can swallow it up and thus ignore it. Here we need to turn to probability, a totally different concept. The Gemara therefore looks for a different comparison. אחרי רבים להטות would not cover this case.

I believe that we learned two very important ideas from this discussion of Rove by RGN. The first is that a Gezeirat Hakatuv has rationale and that rationale can be applied to other cases. The second is the idea that, as Mitzvot are for the betterment of humans and not to placate God, as we apply the practical rules of a Mitzvah, we look at how it affects the person who performs the mitzvah. It is not the actual reality that plays a key role but rather the perception of the person affected. These are very Maimonidean concepts! We also learned that we must not separate learning from its applications in real life and take into account the influence it has on the person who is committed to Halacha.

Disclaimer:

I left out a few other references that RGN addresses such as a Mordechai in Chulin who quotes a rabbeinu Yakar and a Tosafot in Baba Kama that suggests that Rabbi Meir who takes into account the minority does so only in cases similar to Yibum of a minor. They add to the theses of RGN and strengthen it but it would be an impossibly long post and possibly distracting from the main point.

Shabbat Shalom.

The Perspicacity of Our Leaders - A Heart Wrenching Case Study.

2011-10-28T05:20:00.001-04:00

I am not a historian and I don’t usually write about history but I cannot contain myself from writing about this very disturbing and terrible story. It is an indictment; I believe one of many indictments, of Da’at Torah (Da’as Taireh J) and demonstrate clearly how wrong and distorted the thinking of the leaders of the Agudah and the other parties further right of them is. This goes for the leaders of the Agudah back to its formation in the early 1900’s and for the current “Gedolim” and their sycophants. It also points to how wrong what I believe are the fantasy worlds our brethren live in who believe that the supernatural and its supposed powers are part of religion and denying it is considered Kefirah. The “hardening of hearts” of these leaders, similar to the one of Pharaoh and Sichon, as understood by Rambam in the 6^th chapter of Hilchot Teshuvah , is unfortunately seen today every time one reads about one of the shenanigans of these leaders or reads one of their hate filled diatribes, distorting reality.

When I heard about the recent passing of Professor Mendel Piekarz I decided to buy several of his books. Over the years I had read articles he wrote and now I had the urge to read more. I just finished the first book – Ideological Trends of Hasidim in Poland during the Interwar Period and the Holocaust (Hebrew) - which was published in 1990 (shows how up to date I am with History) and I am extremely shaken. It is a fact- filled report and analysis based on the writings of the religious Jewish Polish leaders of the inter-war generation, how they ignored the signs of the impending catastrophe and how the majority refused to even acknowledge it when the sword was clearly unsheathed and upon their neck. It reminds me of the letter Rambam wrote to the sages of Montpellier (see page 480 in Rav Shailat’s letters) where he blames the destruction of the Temple on the Jews turning to the supernatural instead of diplomacy and defense. Much of this is generally known and much has been written about this (see Hakirah ) including the episode I focus on in this post, but it must be retold again and again to remind us that all we have is our sechel, our own intelligence, and the supposed supernatural powers and “De’ah” of our “Gedolim” is pure hogwash and probably falls under the rubric of idolatry.

The Belzer rebbe, Rav Aharon Rokeach, managed to escape from Poland to Hungary through the efforts of many of his worldwide followers who expended every possible effort to save him from the extermination camps. This was at the beginning of 1944, a few months before the Nazis invaded Hungary. His plan however was to go on to Palestine, using highly-rationed Jewish Agency certificates to enter Palestine, provided by the hated Zionists, those same people whom he blamed for the holocaust because of their lack of religiosity and their courage taking matters into their hand in Israel, thus upsetting the higher spheres from whence all power emanates. The Belzer Rebbe’s brother, Rav Mordechai Rokeach of Bilgoray (the father of the current Belzer rebbe), who was 22 years younger and his brother’s spokesman made a farewell speech in Budapest which was printed in the Haderech journal on February 7^th 1944. I have attached below a copy of pertinent pages of a copy of the original publication which I want to discuss.

After a somewhat convoluted exposition of his view of what caused the destruction of Polish Jewry, basically a veiled indictment of the Zionist movement, R. Mordechai addresses his brother and his own planned escape from Europe. Here is the translation beginning 3 lines from the bottom of the first page.

“I have some more to say to you, to address your thoughts and illuminate your eyes, regarding that which I heard many of you say that you are afraid and shudder with fear, saying that our leaving is difficult for you. You are further worried wondering whether possibly my brother the Tzaddik who sees the future, knows of danger looming over this country and is therefore running away to go to Eretz Israel, the land God blessed by saying “I will bring peace to the land”. He is going to a place of peace and rest and we, God forbid he leaves to our despair. What will become of us? Who will protect us? Who will save us? Who will pray and advocate for us? I therefore feel obligated to tell you the truth dear friends, the sages of Hungary, that as one who is close and near my great brother I know that he is not running away, leaving in a rush as if wanting to flee from here but rather is going because he has a strong wish to go to Eretz Israel, the land that is ten times holier than anywhere else. I personally know that this has been his greatest wish for some time, the great aspiration of his pure soul is to go to the city of God, so that he can awaken God’s pity and goodwill for the nation so that they no longer suffer saving the remainder [of the nation] and see to it that their enemies are destroyed. This is alluded to in the verse (Breishit 49:14) “He [Issachar] saw that the homestead was goodly, that the land was delightful, and he put his shoulder to the load, became a toiling serf.” Rashi explains that Issachar became a toiling serf to his brethren by legislating for them Torah laws. I wonder what Rashi meant with this? I believe that he is saying that the Tzaddik [Issachar] sees that this country and its inhabitants will have peace, for the homestead is goodly and only good will befall our brethren the inhabitants of this land. Seeing that, the Tzaddik now sees the land, the one he always thrived to move to because it is delightful, for it is where the ultimate [divine] delight is present, the land of milk and honey is sweet and delightful both physically and spiritually and it also is the place he spoke about going to in earlier times when he was still home.”

In retrospect this speech is pathetic, so pathetic that this section was completely left out when the post-war hagiographers recounted the “miraculous” escape of the Belzer rebbe from Europe (see Bezalel Landau and Natan Orenter’s “The Holy Rabbi of Belz… pages 141 159). Did he really mean it when he said that the Hungarian Jews were safe? Was he that stupid? The Rebbe and his brother by this time had lost all their family having left them behind while they fled. How could he in good faith claim that his brother could see the future, that he had any perspicacity when he had stopped many of his followers from leaving Poland between the wars because of his anti-Zionist stance?

Several months after this episode, the Stropkover Rebetzin reacted to this speech in a heart wrenching way. One of the Sonder Commandos at Auschwitz took notes of his experiences and hid them around the ovens. They were discovered after the war and one of them related the following: (My translation from Hebrew which is a translation of the original Yiddish)

“At the end of May 1944 a transport of Jews from Kasho (Kosice) arrived. Amongst the various Jews was the old Rebetzin of Stropkov, an 85 year old Jewess. She declared: I see the end of the Hungarian Jews has arrived. The government had given the opportunity for the great part of the Jewish Community to escape. The people asked the advice of the Admorim (the Rebbes) and they always calmed the people. The Rebbe of Belz said that Hungary will be spared and only suffer fear. The bitter moment has arrived, when the Jews could no longer save themselves. True [the future] was hidden from them [the Rebbes] by divine decree, but they saved themselves running away at the last moment to Eretz Israel. They saved themselves while leaving their flock to be slaughtered. Ribbono Shel Olam! At the last moments of my life I beg You, forgive them for the great Chilul Hashem [they caused].”

Are we ever going to learn?

Defining The Written and The Oral Law - A Short Overview.

2011-10-18T05:16:00.000-04:00

Over Yomtov I was asked how I understand the argument between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akivah recorded in Yoma Perek 7 Mishnah 3 about the order of the Korbanot on Yom Kippur. After all both Tanaim were around during the Churban, especially Rabbi Eliezer who was a Talmid of Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakai and was already a noted scholar at the time of the Churban, so how did they not know how it was done? That question indeed applies to many other such arguments between Tanaim about daily practices. Was there no mimetic practice?

After Yeshiva I walked away with a very confused concept of what are Torah Shebiktav and Torah sheba’al peh, the written and the oral Torah. I don’t know how others see it, but I was convinced that Moshe wrote the torah at Sinai, adding pieces over time until Arvot Moav while he also transmitted oral law that he received from God including the 13 hermeneutical rules. The oral law was composed of these laws and their extension derived through the 13 midot and that was Torah sheba’al peh. I was always a little confused about how to differentiate between what Moshe received and what was derived later and how all could be seen as Sinaitic and I lived with my confusion. Of course no one directed me to the Rambam’s Hakdamah to the Mishnah or even to Hilchot Mamrim which was outside the yeshiva learning curriculum. It is only later, on my own and in learning with Chaveirim that I finally built a clearer picture about this whole issue.

Rambam in his introduction to the Mishnah describes in detail how Moshe received each Mitzvah orally together with its Pirush and Biur, explanation and clarification, and then transmitted them to Aharon individually repeating the same to Aharon’s sons in his presence, again to the Elders of the people in the presence of the former and the people in the presence of all the preceding ones. Then Aharon and the others repeated the procedure so that everyone heard each Mitzvah and its explanations and clarifications four times. Only then did each one write down the text of the Mitzvah privately and memorized the explanations and clarifications, repeating all this amongst them and analyzing all this material. Rambam refers to the Pirush and Biur jointly as “Kabbalah”.

“And the elders spread amongst the people to teach and review until that Mikra [dictated text] is known and they understand how to read it [comprehend it]. And they teach them the Biur [explanation] of that Mikra as it was given by God. That Biur is [comprised] of generalities [about the Law]. And they [the people] were writing down the Mikra and memorizing the Kabbalah orally, and it is thus that the Sages say “Torah Shebiktav and Torah Sheba’al Peh”.” (Introduction to Pirush Hamishna)

The dictated text was to be memorized and then written down verbatim and the Rabbis refer to it as the written Law, Torah Shebiktav while the Kabbalah was to be memorized in an oral form. The Kabbalah being comprised of the Biur and the Pirush is referred to by the Rabbis as Torah Sheba’al Peh. It is only that portion of the oral law that is the original designation of Torah sheba’al Peh. This process of transmitting Mikra and Kabbalah went on for the 40 years of the Midbar without any official written document other than the Luchot – the Tablets. During this period, besides each person writing down for themselves the verbatim text and memorizing the kabbalah, questions about cases that were not covered by the Mikra and the Kabbalah were debated as to which Mitzvah they would pertain and what ruling should apply. Those debates were based on the 13 hermeneutical rules and when divergent opinions were proposed, decided by majority vote of the court – Beit Din. The Kabbalah part of the Law was maintained orally in its original form through the generations and Rambam claims that it was never forgotten nor was there any question about its exact content. All recorded arguments were always in the other parts of the Law, the derivative parts which are called Talmud (Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:11-12).

Finally at the end of the forty years in the desert, as Moshe felt death approaching, he gathered up the people and offered to review with anyone that had forgotten a certain Kabbalah and answer any question that may have arisen. It is only then that Moshe began writing the 13 Sifrei Torah, twelve of which he gave one to each tribe and the 13^th to the tribe of Levi to place in the Aron next to the tablets.

In Hilchot Mamrim 2:1 Rambam writes:

א בית דין הגדול שדרשו באחת מן המידות כפי מה שנראה בעיניהם שהדין כך, ודנו דין, ועמד אחריהם בית דין אחר, ונראה לו טעם אחר לסתור אותו הדין--הרי זה סותר, ודן כפי מה שייראה בעיניו: שנאמר "אל השופט, אשר יהיה בימים ההם" (דברים יז,ט)--אין אתה חייב ללכת, אלא אחר בית דין שבדורך.

A Great Court that arrived at a conclusion about a Law using one of the Midot (hermeneutical rules) and implemented that Law, was followed by a subsequent Court who found another argument to contradict that [earlier] ruling, that later court may do so. They may rule according to their own conclusion as it says “… to the judge that will be at that time”, you do not have to follow other than the court of your generation.

It is completely acceptable for a court to overturn a ruling of a predecessor if it is for a case that was derived using the hermeneutical rules. As long as the Mikra or the Kabbalah was not affected, rulings that result from derivative deductions using the traditional methods of analysis may result in divergent rulings from court to court. Of course, we are talking about the Supreme Court - בית דין הגדול of a particular period versus one of a different time. There was no divergent ruling during one period as the Supreme Court always had the final word. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akivah were merely reconstructing possible arguments of the different courts at different times. The order of the Korbanot on Yom Kippur may have been different at different periods of time. The practice in the Temple was not exactly the same from generation to generation.

Continuing with this presentation of the different components of the Torah received at Sinai, Rambam in his Introduction to the Pirush Hamishna addresses the category of Halacha Lemoshe Misinai (HLM). Where does it fit in, if we already have the Sinaitic Kabbalah? He explains that the Kabbalah many times can be shown in the text either through a direct textual analysis or through the hermeneutical process. The way to discern whether a ruling is based on Kabbalah or on hermeneutical rules is by checking if there is any argument or dissension on the Law. Those that have arguments amongst Rabbis cannot be based on Kabbalah and must be derivative while those that do not have any argument recorded, may potentially be Kabbalah.

“Although [these laws] were based on Kabbalah [Mekubalot] and there is no argument about them, these Pirushim may be derived through exacting textual analysis of the Mikra that we received using the hermeneutical method, Asmachta method, as well as the clues and indications found in the Mikra. When you see argumentation and dissension based on logical methods where proofs are adduced for one of the Pirushim and other such discussions, … [Rambam brings the discussion Sukkah 35a about the Etrog], that is not because they ever had a doubt and were looking for proof for what it (Pri Etz Hadar] is, for we saw since the times of Yehoshua until now that an Etrog was used together with a lulav every year without any dissension. They were only looking to see if they could find in the Mikra an indication that it was an Etrog. The same goes for their [textual] deduction regarding the Hadas, or their deduction that one who amputates any limb of a fellow human being pays a fine … “

The rabbis tried to find textual support for the Kabalot they received over the generations going back to Moshe. They assumed that as they came from the same author, there must be a self-evident clue or an underlying theme in the text that took into account that oral Kabbalah. When they could not find any such clue, they would say that this Kabbalah is HLM. HLM is a designation of a Kabbalah that has no trace in the Mikra.

This brings us to a Rambam that at first glance is hard to understand. In Hilchot Chovel Umazik 1:5

ומניין שזה שנאמר באברים "עין תחת עין . . ." (שמות כא,כד; ויקרא כד,כ), תשלומין הוא--שנאמר "חבורה, תחת חבורה" (שמות כא,כה), ובפירוש נאמר "וכי יכה איש את ריעהו, באבן או באגרוף . . . רק שבתו ייתן, ורפוא ירפא" (ראה שמות כא,יח-יט). הא למדת ש"תחת" שנאמר בחבורה תשלומין, והוא הדין ל"תחת" הנאמר בעין ובשאר אברים

How do we know that “eye for an eye” that it says in the case of [damage caused to] limbs is payment, because it says “a wound for a wound” and it is explicit [elsewhere] “should a man hit another with a stone or a fist… he should pay for his idleness and healing”. We thus see that [the term] “for a [Tachat]” that is used in the case of a wound means payment, so too does it mean in the case of the eye and other limbs payment.

In other words, there is textual support for the non-literal interpretation of “eye for an eye”. This kind of textual support may be subject to debate. It is not uncommon for arguments amongst Tanaim and Amoraim to develop on such type of analysis. Is this a ruling by a specific court and the ruling may be overturned by another just like any hermeneutically derived law?

ו אף על פי שדברים אלו נראים מעניין תורה שבכתב, כולן מפורשין הן מפי משה מהר סיני, וכולן הלכה למעשה הן בידינו; וכזה ראו אבותינו דנין בבית דינו של יהושוע, ובבית דינו של שמואל הרמתי, ובכל בית דין ובית דין שעמדו מימות משה ועד עכשיו.

Although these words appear to pertain amongst matters of the written law [i.e. are based on textual analysis – DG], all are as explained from the mouth of Moshe from Sinai, and all are practical Law as performed by us always. Our forefathers saw this ruling in the court of Yehoshua, in Shmuel of Ramah’s court, and in every court that was ever in place from the time of Moshe to our time.

Although it would appear from the Talmudic discussions that this non-literal interpretation of the text is based on textual analysis, the fact that we have no records of any court ever dissenting leads us to accept this as a Pirush. It is a Kabbalah based interpretation which has been shown to agree with the related laws in the text. It is therefore also not a HLM as Rambam wrote in the previously quoted introduction to Pirush Hamishna. The Law in this case is so different than the plain text עין תחת עין and there is no dissension recorded, the Gemara taking it for granted and other than looking for a clue in the written text, there is no discussion of it being otherwise is an indication that it belongs to the category of kabbalah. Rambam sees it important to point this out and make it clear in this Halacha.

For a much more detailed discussion of this whole subject see Torat Neviim by Maharatz Chayot (Rabbi Tzvi Hirsh Chayot) in volume 1 of Kol Sifrei Maharatz Chayot page 111 and on. Since much more has been written on the subject both in traditional learning circles and academia. The above is a simplified presentation that I have organized for myself.

Resag's verdict on the Belief in the Transmigration of Souls - Gilgul - Nonsense!

2011-10-06T20:55:00.001-04:00

In the most recent issue of the Jewish Review of Books there is a rather acerbic exchange between professors Flatto and Nadler about whether the Noda Beyehuda was a crypto-Kabbalist or not. That exchange then migrated to the web in the form of at times insulting comments and exchanges on a post on the Hirhurim blog here which led to the removal by the blog owner of all comments. I am really not interested in getting into the debate although I am more inclined to side with Nadler, especially since one of the NB’s greatest and most famous pupil, Rabbi Eliezer Fleckeles is noted for his public anti-Kabbalist stand in his Teshuvah Me’ahava, see also here . I however would like to translate a segment of Rav Sa’adyah Gaon (Resag) on the subject in the sixth Ma’amar of his Hanivchar Be’emunot Vede’ot (page 214 in Rav Kafieh’s edition) which is illuminating about the worldview of one of our classical greats.

“I will further say[1] that there are some people amongst those that are referred to as Jews that I discovered that they believe in Gilgul referring to it as “transmigration”. The idea, to their mind, is that the soul of Reuven passes to Shimon, then to Levi and then to Yehuda. Most of them believe that it is possible for the soul of a human to be present in an animal and the soul of an animal in a person, and other such nonsense and confusions. It became clear to me what illusions has brought them to believe in this and I found that there are four mistakes that caused this, which I will mention and refute. The first mistake of theirs is their erroneous following of four of the theories about the soul which I have disproven, or possibly because they follow the theory of those who believe there can be more than one spiritual entity[2], all theories that I have already disproven[3]. Their second mistake is because they observed the personality of many people and noted that they resemble the nature of animals. Some people are meek like sheep while others are aggressive like feral beasts, while others are nasty and debased like dogs and others are fleet like birds and so on. They therefore deduced that the only possibility for this wide variety amongst humans is because of their animalistic souls. This demonstrates, God preserve you from such calamity, their great stupidity, for they think that the human body causes essential changes to the soul, so much so that it can transform it from an animal one to a human one. That [transformed] soul then changes the human being to the point that he takes on animal behavior while he looks human. It is not enough that they made the soul into an entity that continuously changes essence without establishing for it an individual essence, they also contradicted themselves by giving it the power to change the body by overturning its essence while at the same time the body changes it. This is totally irrational.”

Resag then addresses the two other arguments for transmigration. One argument is that without transmigration it would be unjust on the part of God to let young children die. It is only if we believe they lived in the past that their death can be seen as a punishment for deeds done in a past life and thus see it as justice. He dismisses the argument summarily by pointing to their misunderstanding God’s justice and the concept of reward and punishment. The other argument is from various texts and verses in Tanach. He addresses every one separately showing how they misinterpret and at times read verses out of context. Finally he adds –

“I would not have bothered to mention their theory, rightfully so, as it is quite ridiculous, if not for fear of causing fools to be misguided.”

It is interesting to see how Resag took it for obvious that the idea of Gilgul is irrational and even questions the Jewishness of those who believe in it. Of course other Rishonim felt otherwise and by the time Ramban wrote his Pirush on Chumash he saw it as an essential part of reality as the underlying rationale for certain Mitzvot such as Yibum. By the time the Arizal arrived it became central Jewish dogma with some of the more mystically inclined considering it heresy to deny such evident “truth”. I personally am happy and feel quite comfortable to agree with Resag relying on him to pull me out of Gehinom for my heresy in this matter.

[1] This is an idiomatic curiosity of many of the medieval writers.

[2] This segment is a little difficult to decipher (see Rav Kafieh’s note 3). Apparently Resag is saying that they base their understanding of Gilgul on a foreign, non-Jewish, concept of spirituality.

[3] This segment is at the end of a lengthy discussion about the soul and spirituality which I hope to address separately.

Must a Corporealist Always Be Considered a Min According To Rambam?

2011-08-08T05:08:00.001-04:00

I just read a very interesting article by Professor Harry Wolfson A”H in a collection of his articles translated into Hebrew published by Magnes Press entitled Hamachshava Hayehudit Bi’yemei Habeinay’m (page 283). This article, “The uniqueness of God and His transcendence in Rambam’s thought” (the article was English in its original and I am sure my translation of the Hebrew title is not exactly its original title) discusses the opening halachot of the Mishne Torah (MT) in the first chapter of Hilchot Yesodei Hatorah. Wolfson shows how Rambam was subtly addressing concepts that were prevalent at his time in the writings of different Muslim and Christian philosophers and theologians. That is not the focus of this post but rather an issue he discusses within the context of the article.

Rambam explains God’s absolute uniqueness as meaning that God cannot be compared with any other existent and that is one of the central Halachot in that chapter which then elicits quite a bit of discussion and clarifications. One Rambam argument is that perfect uniqueness negates corporeality for if God is corporeal even if uniquely so, He would still be comparable to another corporeal entity. Therefore when we declare in Shema that God is One we are saying that God is unique in an absolute uniqueness that cannot be compared to anything else that exists. The understanding of this is according to Rambam the positive commandment of Yichud Hashem as he explains in Hilchot Yesodei Hatorah 1:4

והואיל ואינו גוף, לא יארעו מאורעות הגופות כדי שיהא נחלק ונפרד מאחר; לפיכך אי אפשר שיהיה אלא אחד. וידיעת דבר זה--מצות עשה, שנאמר "ה' אלוהינו, ה' אחד"

Being that He is not corporeal, the accidents that occur in a body do not occur to Him that would allow for Him to be divided and separated from another. Therefore He must be One only. Knowing this is a positive commandment as it says “Hashem is our God, Hashem is One”.

In Sefer Hamitzvot, Rambam counts this commandment as the second Mitzvat Asseh - positive commandment. Based on this proposition Rambam then rules in Hilchot Teshuvah 3:7 listing amongst the 5 people considered Minim;

והאומר שיש שם מנהיג, אבל הם שניים או יתר; והאומר שיש שם ריבון אחד, אלא שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה

One who says that there is a Leader, but there are two or more; and one who says that there is one Lord but He has a body and an image [is a Min].

Three questions come to mind about the meaning of the word האומר – one who says - in this context.

1. Does it mean that only one who says so, namely is convinced rationally that it is so is considered a Min or even one of the masses who is just going along with the simplistic understanding of things? Wolfson presents the question even more incisively. Let us take the proposition that God has a body, what would be the status of a simple person who cannot conceive of anything “existing” without it having substance. Existence without substance is not something we can recognize with our senses but requires a lot of philosophical training to really appreciate such a possibility. Would a simple person who could not conceive existence without substance but still maintains that God is unique, also be considered a Min?

2. When Rambam says that one who says that there is a leader but there are more than one is a Min, does he include someone who believes that God has external attributes? Most people would have trouble grasping what Rambam demonstrates that God with accidental attributes is synonymous with Him having substance. Would a person who cannot conceive of such a concept and believes that God has attributes but at the same time has no substance, be considered a Min? Or is a Min only one who is convinced of that philosophically, namely “says so”?

3. Finally, in Hilchot Yesodei Hatorah 1:8 Rambam quotes three verses as textual proof that God has no body. One of them

ונאמר "ואל מי תדמיוני, ואשווה" (ישעיהו מ,כה); ואילו היה גוף, היה דומה לשאר גופים

The [prophet] says: “to whom can you liken Me, to whom can I compare?” If He were a body, He would be likened to other bodies.

Rambam ties God’s unity and incorporeality together; because the prophet says that He is incomparable to other existents, therefore He cannot be corporeal like they are. This is a philosophical argument that Rambam superimposes on the text to prove that God is not corporeal. Let us say that a person argues that God has a body but it is unique and exclusive to God. Does not that too meet the criteria of incomparability? Would such a person be a Min?

In this post I will discuss Wolfson’s resolution to the first question leaving his answer to the other two for upcoming posts.

In sefer Hamitzvot Asseh 2, Rambam starts by saying, היא הציווי שנצטווינו להאמין בייחוד – the commandment is to believe in uniqueness. The verse that he uses as the source for this Mitzvah is שמע ישראל ה' אלוקינו ה' אחד. He then subtly changes the presentation of the mitzvah by saying

וקוראים למצווה זו גם 'מלכות שמים' כי אומרים כדי לקבל עליו על מלכות שמים, כלומר ההודאה בייחוד והאמונה בו

This Mitzvah is also referred to as “rule of Heaven” as they [the Rabbis] say “to accept upon himself the rule of Heaven” namely the acknowledgement in unity and the belief in Him.

Rambam moved from belief to acknowledgement. At the beginning of each section of Halachot in MT, Rambam lists all the Mitzvot that underlie the rules that will be discussed in that section and they are supposed to parallel and be traced back to Sefer Hamitzvot[1]. At the beginning of Hilchot Yesodei Hatorah he lists this Mitzvah as לייחדו[2] – literally to make Him unique. What exactly does he mean with that? Wolfson suggests that Rambam is thinking of the Midrash Shir Hashirim 7:11 (and from there this entered into the daily prayer book) ומיחדים שמו שתי פעמים ואומרים שמע ישראל ה' אלוהינו ה' אחד – They declaim His uniqueness twice [daily] by saying Shema … Thus not only is it a requirement that one believe in the uniqueness of God but also one has to declaim acknowledgement of that uniqueness. Halacha takes a theological Mitzvah and turns it into a practical performance; belief becomes a declaration.

Halacha is not satisfied with a positive commandment. It also establishes a negative commandment, the first negative commandment in Rambam’s count -

היא האזהרה שהוזהרנו מלהאמין אלוהות לזולתו יתעלה

It [the commandment] is that we were forbidden to believe that anyone else is a deity.

Here too when the Mitzvah is listed at the beginning of these halachot Rambam changes it slightly to give it a practical performance format –

שלא יעלה[3] במחשבה שיש שם אלוה זולתי ה

One should not bring to mind that there is a deity besides God.

Again, believing is changed to” bringing to mind”, a willful act rather than a simple belief. This is further confirmed as the Halacha describes this prohibition (idem 1:6) -

וכל המעלה על דעתו שיש שם אלוה אחר, חוץ מזה--עובר בלא תעשה, שנאמר "לא יהיה לך אלוהים אחרים, על פניי.

Anyone that brings to mind that there is another god in addition to this One – transgresses the negative commandment, “you should not have other gods upon my face” …

But what does “bringing to mind” entail? In Hilchot Avodah Zara 2:6 the detailed description of how this prohibition is transgressed

כל המודה בעבודה זרה, שהיא אמת--אף על פי שלא עבדה, הרי זה מחרף ומגדף את השם הנכבד והנורא

One who acknowledges an Avodah Zara (idol) that it is true, even if he has not worshipped it, he reviles and curses the glorious and fearsome Name [God].

Rambam then adds- ואחד העובד עבודה זרה, ואחד המגדף את השם – whether someone worships an idol or curses the Name … Clearly the two prohibitions are similar both in their context and their action so much so that acknowledging more than one god is seen as cursing Him. Considering that the prohibition of cursing God is only transgressed once one declaims the curse

אין המגדף חייב סקילה, עד שיפרש את השם המיוחד של ארבע אותיות שהוא אלף דלת נון יוד, ויברך אותו בשם מן השמות שאינן נמחקים

One may therefore assume that acknowledging an idol is done by declamation too. A declarative acknowledgement of an idol as true is the practical transgression of “bringing to mind” that there is more than one God so by extension when Rambam said והאומר שיש שם מנהיג, אבל הם שניים או יתר – a Min is “one who says that there is a Leader, but there are two or more” he is only considered a Min if he says so – if he makes a declarative acknowledgement of a plurality of gods. Thus someone who cannot conceive that God has no substance, that such an entity could “exist”, but maintains that God is unique, however contradictory that position is logically , he is not a Min; he is just a misguided simple unsophisticated Jew. [4]

[1] See the introduction to Sefer Hamitzvot where Rambam explains that the work is a preparation for his upcoming Mishne Torah as a way to insure he does not skip over a Mitzvah. Having done that, he again lists all the Mitzvot at the beginning of Mishne Torah and again at the beginning of each Sefer and again at the beginning of each section of Halachot.

[2] See also the listing at the beginning of MT where he lists the Mitzvah as

לייחדו, שנאמר "ה' אלוהינו, ה' אחד

[3] יעלה can be translated “come” to mind or “enter” the mind which would have a passive connotation or “bring” to mind which is active . However when the Halacha is described Rambam uses וכל המעלה which must be translated anyone who “brings” to mind making it clear that יעלה is meant in its active connotation.

[4] I refer the reader to Hakirah 11 page 232 where Professor Menachem Kellner seems to have missed this Wolfson article. See further Hakirah 10 page 135 in Rabbi Buchman’s article where he seems to have arrived at a similar conclusion as Wolfson from another perspective.

Was Rabbi Moshe Taku A Corporealist?

2011-07-26T17:04:00.001-04:00

Rabbi Moshe Ben Chasdai Taku (circa 1200-1250) was a younger contemporary of Rabbi Yehuda Hachassid (1140-1217) and is considered nowadays in many circles as the central medieval proponent of a corporeal understanding of God. See for example this post by R. Nathan Slifkin where he also makes an assertion that earlier Ashkenaz Rishonim were not philosophically inclined and did not know any earlier philosophical writings. I never bought into this and could not imagine that such great and brilliant scholars would not have amongst them at least a smattering of inquisitive thinkers who would try to understand the reason for existence and other such philosophical issues. True those were dark ages in Europe and contact with the southern part of the continent was tenuous, they still would have developed a philosophy of their own. As we will see, they did but also had more contact with the rest of Judaism then is commonly thought.

As I began learning Rav Sa’adyah Gaon’s (892-942) (henceforth Resag) thought, I started getting interested in his place in Jewish thought in a historical context and discovered that indeed he was the source of almost all medieval Jewish thought and all the divergent theologies that subsequently developed were based on Resag. I am currently reading Professor Joseph Dan’s magnum opus Toldot Torat Hasod Ha’avrit which is now up to 6 volumes with more to come. Volumes 5 and 6 deal mostly with the Chassidei Ashkenaz beginning with Rabbi Shmuel (born 1115), the father of Rabbi Yehuda through Rabbi Eliezer of Worms (1160-1238) known as the Rokeach and his generation. These Rishonim were part of the great Kalonimus family that migrated from Lucca, Italy to the German towns along the Rhine anywhere between 800 (during the reign of Charlemagne) and 973 depending on the historian. The Chassidei Ashkenaz led by Rabbi Shmuel and subsequently by Rabbi Yehuda Hachassid, the most prominent and famous leader amongst them, developed a mystical approach to Judaism which had its roots in the writings of Resag, Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra (1089-1174), the Kuzari (Rabbi Yehuda Halevy - 1075-1141) at times expanding on the ideas proposed by these greats and at others disagreeing and using their ideas to argue for their own insights. Amongst the well-known writings of that school is the Sefer Chassidim which was composed in part by Rabbi Shmuel with the greatest part written by R. Yehuda and probably contains additions subsequently added by some of his disciples. The Rokeach is another important sefer that is also central as a source in Halacha. Less well known but also important is the Arugat Habossem, a commentary on the prayer book and the Piyutim written around 1234 by Rabbi Avraham ben Azriel from Bohemia. Another famous composition of that school is Shir Hayichud; the poem that is part of the Yom Kippur night prayer liturgy which has been shown (more about this later) to be a poetic presentation of Resag’s thought found in his Pirush on Sefer Yetzira and his Emunot Vede’ot. Although some think its author was Rabbi Yehuda Hachassid, it clearly was already well known and part of the liturgy at his time as he quotes it as a proof text in one of his philosophical writings. Rabbi Yehuda Hachassid was therefore clearly acquainted with the thought of Resag as were others in his school. In fact based on quotations that we find in their writings we can even trace quotes from Emunot Vede’ot- which is written originally in Arabic – to a translation that preceded the more common and well known R. Yehuda Ibn Tibon (circa 1120-1190) translation. It is not a verbatim translation but rather a flowery paraphrase.

This brings us to an important manuscript – the Sefer Hakavod – another sefer of that era and school of thought with many excerpts quoted by Joseph Dan in his book Toldot. Although the manuscript we have at Oxford is anonymous, Rabbi Yehuda Hachassid is named as its author by R. Moshe Taku in his Ktav Tamim (more about it later) and is a basis for a mystical sefer written by R. Eliezer of Worms the great pupil of Rabbi Yehuda. The Sefer Hakavod focuses principally on the question of how revelation – Nevuah – works. The problem is that there cannot be a connection between a transcendental God and a human being who is physical. God does not talk nor does He have a form or shape or body. That being the case what did the prophet see or hear in his vision? What exactly is Shechina the word used in Chazal to depict the presence of God? Sefer Hakavod proposes three possible explanations; one based on a Rav Hai Gaon Responsa, another based on Resag and the third its own explanation. I do not want to go into the details at this time but want to point out that all three explanations are consistent with an understanding of a transcendental God.

We now come to Rabbi Moshe Taku. Abraham Berliner (1833-1915) wrote an article about the Shir Hayichud which was translated from the German and published by Mossad Harav Kook (1969) in the two volume Selected Writings (Hebrew) pages 147-180. Berliner did not have access to the Oxford manuscript of Sefer Hakavod thus not knowing of its reference to Shir Hayichud. He therefore claims that the first mention of the poem is in R. Moshe Taku’s (RMT henceforth) Ktav Tamim (KT henceforth). He then proceeds to give a short appraisal of KT and its author. Here are some excerpts that I hope will give a flavor about this interesting Rishon.

RMT was born in Tachau (Tachov nowadays and part of the Czech Republic). He lived in Regensburg and died in Neustadt next to Vienna. R. Yehuda Hachassid also lived in Regensburg at approximately the same time thus it is probable that both he and RMT had access to the same sources and writings. We know that RMT sent a Responsa to Magdeburg around 1225-1230 which indicates that he flourished somewhere between 1225 and 1250 giving us an approximate date for his publishing KT. The manuscript of KT that we have is only a small part of a much more extensive sefer. The fragment that remained is complemented by a long quote in Arugat Habossem. In KT, RMT attacks the philosophical/theological theories that were circulating during his time, quoting from Sefer Hakavod, Yessod Mora vesod Torah of Ibn Ezra, Sefer Hamada of Rambam, Shir Hayichud and Emunot Vede’ot in its paraphrased translation (see above). He accuses them all of inventing theories, all building on Resag’s writings, which according to RMT distort what Chazal really believed.

“There is a poem called Shir Hayichud, I heard that it was authored by R. Bezalel using the Sefer Ha’emunot as a basis. He did not author it completely because from the stanza beginning with Shadai, R. Shmuel (the father of R. Yehuda Hachassid) authored it.”

Abraham Berliner comments that R. Bezalel is unknown from anywhere else but this reference to him here is probably the source for a later claim that the author of Shir Hayichud is the Christian priest Michael Basilios (the name Basilios and Bezalel having a similar sound). The Vilna Gaon indeed forbade the saying of it in his shul and tried to find the name Michael Basilios in the acrostic at the end of day 3.

Abraham Berliner argues that contrary the popular belief, RMT was no corporealist at all. Corporealism was anathema to all Jewish scholars. The issue was how to deal with verses in Tanach and sayings of the Rabbis that contradicted this basic belief. Resag followed by other medieval philosophers developed a sophisticated approach, interpreting all these difficult utterances allegorically or as a metaphor. RMT objected to that approach and felt that it is better to accept these corporealist statements as they are, admitting that we do not know how to interpret them. The interpretations lead to distorted and wrong opinions that inadvertently support one form or other of Corporealism.

Berliner argues that RMT had a highly developed critical sense and questioned everything. In a discussion of the limits of human apprehension RMT quotes a Sifre that Moshe at the time of his death was able to apprehend so much that what he had apprehended during his life seemed obscure (Aspekaleria She’eina Me’ira)[1]. He follows this by a quote from the controversial Sefer Shiur Komah that refers to the Sefer Aleph Beit Derabbi Akivah, which belongs to the Heichalot literature. He prefaces it by questioning “if it is reliable being it is not found in our Babylonian Talmud, or in the Yerushalmi, or in the well-known Midrashim. For there are books that were forged by the Christians to fool the world, like Perek Shira where it says at the end of it[2] that whoever reads it constantly so and so vouch for him… So too in Sefer Ha’evarim (?) it is written that His right hand is called such and such and His left such and such. At the end he writes that “Rabbi Ishmael says that whoever knows this secret I and Akivah vouch for him”. One cannot trust this as they write this to reinforce their words.” In other words these reinforcing comments in themselves create a doubt about the authenticity of these books. He then comments, “Every person that is disturbed by these external writings should ignore them and by doing this will not lose his love of God”.

Berliner points out that we clearly see that RMT holds that God is beyond our comprehension and only objects to explanations of contrary texts that are possibly wrong. He objects to speculative metaphysics and prefers to remain silent in awe of the unknown. His greatest criticism is directed at Resag, who he sees as the inventor of this approach and all others including the Chassidei Ashkenaz led by R. Yehuda Hachassid as his followers. “My complaint is on the Sefer Ha’emunot for he accepts foreign knowledge and sinned greatly by distancing many people from perfect fear of Heaven to speculate about matters to the point that they no longer know where they stand. He supports the star gazers (astronomers?) who have a grudge on the words [disagree] of our Rabbis and their perfect Torah, preferring their nonsensical prattle. Have we not suffered enough from the sayings of the Christians, pupils of jesus, who interpret the Mitzvot of the torah allegorically or from our compatriots the Karaites who deny the oral law, led by their wicked leaders Anan, Shaul and Abusseri[3] and the rest of their unholy friends?”

He also objects to the approach that tries to synthesize theology with scientific theory of the day. He says that we have to accept the statements in the Torah and Chazal at face value and not worry about their practical aspect. It is better to live with the questions then to come up with erroneous opinions that the original author never meant.

This opinion of Berliner about RMT that he is not a Corporealist is supported by Joseph Dan[4]. Coming back to the start of this post, RMT saw the Chassidei Ashkenaz as philosophers and he objected to that. Clearly philosophy was not alien to their school but in fact they were innovators in the field. It is ridiculous to accuse them of being ignorant of the intellectual ferment that was ongoing during the Middle-Ages because they developed theories based on demonology and other superstitions. That was the science of their culture, time and location and was the accepted wisdom which at the same time did not negate their philosophical speculation. Demons and angels were part of the physical world while God and His relationship with man is a metaphysical issue.

It is important to note that R. Yehuda Hachassid was of the Kalonimus family and the elder R. Kalonimus is quoted by Rashi many times in his commentary on Shas referring to Girsa’ot he brought with him from Rome (Italy). Rashi learned in the Yeshivot in Ashkenaz which were all part of that school of thought. It is inconceivable that Rashi was not aware of all this thinking that was ongoing there and had no inkling of philosophy. I think that “Corporealism” is a label that is used indiscriminately and much more has to be defined about what incorporeality means before we can append that label to an intelligent and brilliant Rishon. I hope to address this further in this forum and elsewhere.

[1] The editor of KT does not find this Sifre which is not uncommon with Midrashim quoted by Rishonim which are no longer extant in current editions. I wonder if that is the basis for Rambam’s description of the death of Moshe, Aharon and Miriam in MN 3:51.

[2] I am not sure if he refers to Aleph Beit or Perek Shira.

[3] I have no idea who Shaul and Abusseri are. I would appreciate if a reader helps.

[4]RMT is quoted with great respect by Ramban in commentary on the first Perek in Gittin, who was his contemporary and refers to him as alive as do many others of his contemporaries and subsequent generations of scholars.

The Waters of Merivah - Punishment Commensurate With The Sin - What Sin?

2011-07-06T06:11:00.000-04:00

Last week’s Parsha we read about the waters of Merivah where the people found themselves without water and clamored for Moshe and Aharon to provide it for them. Moshe eventually took care of the problem but his reaction was deemed inappropriate and was the cause for him and Aharon not entering Israel later. The Midrashim followed by the Rishonim discuss at length what exactly the sin that produced such a harsh punishment was and the reasons cover a wide range which I do not want to get into here. Rambam in Shemona Perakim (introduction to Massechet Avot) chapter 4 has a very unique approach which is strongly rejected by Ramban in his Pirush on the Torah. Although this exchange is quite well known I would like to focus on a detail that I have not seen discussed and I believe is a very important point that needs to be fleshed out.

Here is how to Rambam presents his position:

ואתה יודע, שאדון הראשונים והאחרונים, משה רבנו, כבר אמר עליו השם יתברך:

יען לא האמנתם בי להקדישני לעיני בני ישראל (במדבר כ', י"ב

על אשר מריתם את פי למי מריבה (שם, כ"ד

על אשר לא קדשתם אותי (דברים ל"ב, נ"א

כל זה! וחטאו, עליו השלום, הוא שנטה לצד אחד הקצוות במעלה אחת שבמעלות המידות, והיא הסבלנות!

כאשר נטה לצד הרגזנות, באומרו: שמעו נא המורים (במדבר כ', י'). דקדק עמו הקדוש ברוך הוא: שיהיה אדם כמוהו מתרגז לעיני עדת ישראל, במקום שאין הרגזנות ראויה

וכגון זה באדם שכמותו חילול השם הוא, שכן תנועותיו כולן ודיברותיו, הכל למדים מהם וחומדים בהם האושר בעולם הזה ובעולם הבא. ואיך ייראו בו הרגזנות, והיא ממעשי הרעים כמו שבארנו, ואינה נובעת אלא מתכונה רעה שבנפש.

אבל אמרו בעניין הזה: "מריתם את פי" אינו אלא כמו שאבאר. וזה, שלא היה מדבר עם עמי הארץ, ולא עם מי שאין להם מעלה, אבל עם קהל שהקטנה שבנשיהם הייתה כיחזקאל בן בוזי, כמו שזכרו החכמים. וכל מה שיאמר או יעשה, יבחנוהו. וכאשר ראוהו שהתרגז, אמרו:

“ודאי אין הוא, עליו השלום, מאלה שיש להם פחיתות מידה! ולולא ידע שהאלוהים התאנף בנו על דרישת המים, ושאנחנו הכעסנוהו, יתברך, לא היה מתרגז”.

ואנו לא מצאנו לשם יתברך שהתרגז או שכעס בדברו אליו בעניין הזה; אלא אמר: קח את המטה והקהל את העדה, וגומר (במדבר כ', ח’).

This comes in a discussion of the importance of self-control in the perfection of an individual. Rambam points out that Moshe, the master of all prophets (considered perfected individuals having attained prophecy) was punished, as the quoted verses make clear, in the harshest tone. Moshe and Aharon are accused of (i) not having enough faith which would have sanctified God in the eyes of the people; (ii) to have rebelled against His word; (iii) for not having sanctified Me. Rambam exclaims:

“So much [punishment]?! Moshe’s sin was for having strayed to one of the extremes of a [human] trait namely equanimity, straying toward anger by saying “listen O rebels!” HKBH took issue with him that a man of his caliber should become angry in front of all the people when anger had no place under the circumstances. Such a behavior for a person of his caliber is a Chilul Hashem (desecration of God’s name) for every move and word of his is watched carefully [by the people] so that they can learn from his actions in their desire for happiness in this world and in the world to come. How can they countenance in him anger which is one of the negative [human] traits that stem from an unperfected personality? I will now explain the meaning of [the accusation] “for you have rebelled against My word”. He [Moshe] was not talking to Amei Ha’aretz [ignoramuses] neither was he talking to persons who did not have a certain level of perfection; he was talking to a crowd where the lowliest amongst its women was at the level of [the prophet] Yechezkel ben Buzi[1]. Everything that Moshe said or did was analyzed [tested]. When they saw his anger they assumed that a perfect person like Moshe would not become angry unless God was angry about our actions too. However we do not find any hint that God was agitated or angry when He spoke with Moshe on this matter; all He told him to do was to take the staff and gather up the people.”

This last sentence is of utmost importance. When we read the story in the Chumash, our first impression is that the anxiety and fear induced agitation that comes across from the way the people spoke to Moshe is misplaced and wrong. The impression one gets from the way the text reports the reaction of the people is that it is critical of them. Indeed, Moshe and Aharon felt attacked and it would seem almost fled to the tent of gathering from their wrath. However, according to Rambam’s understanding, that was not correct. The people had every right to be angry at Moshe for having brought them to a place without water and without adequate preparation to deal with that shortage. The Rabbis confirm this way of thinking. Several Midrashim (see Yalkut Shimoni ad locum) point out that God criticized Moshe and Aharon for sitting Shiva for the death of Miriam while the people are dying of thirst urging them to do something about it! When a problem faces people they are expected to act to resolve the problem and not turn to what I term misguided “Bitachon”. The Midah of Bitachon is to have self-confidence and act after having become convinced that the action about to be undertaken is in concord with HKBH’s will and not refraining from acting relying that God will take care of things. Moshe with his reaction misinformed the Jewish people. He taught them an erroneous hashkafah - theology. That is the greatest sin that warrants the harsh punishment - loss of leadership after the goal was reached!

Ramban in his analysis picks up on this idea and seems to agree that in general there is no criticism of the people for acting anxiously when it is warranted. He however reads in between the lines that God was not very pleased with the people and also points to a verse in Tehillim 106:32 that clearly say that the people angered God during this episode. However a careful read of that verse in its context lessens the problem. The important thing about Ramban is that he does not disagree with the premise that it is appropriate for people to be anxious when they are confronted with a situation such as this and that it is required of the leaders to prepare for such eventualities. Even in the desert where the impression we get is that God led them and micromanaged them, ultimately the responsibility fell on the people and their leaders to provide for themselves.

I believe this is an important point that needs to be made in our contemporary society where the mainstream thinking is that frumkeit requires what I term misguided Bitachon.

[1] Rambam refers to Chazal who say the vision seen by a woman slave at the Red Sea, was not seen by Yechezkel ben Buzi (at the vision of the chariots). According to Rambam’s understanding of prophetic visions, these do not appear to unworthy people. A prophetic vision is the result of a person intellectually advanced and with a developed personality.

Theological Methodology by Rav Sa'adyah Gaon.

2011-06-21T06:11:00.002-04:00

Emunot Vede’ot by Rav Sa’adyah Gaon (Resag) is divided into 10 Ma’amarim or sections, each composed of various chapters. The sections were part of the original while the chapters are a later addition and are not always well thought out according to Rav Kafieh. Rav Kafieh in the introduction to his edition which contains the original Judeo-Arabic and a brand new translation, notes that Resag kept on editing the book after publication and for his last version changed the name to Hanivchar Be’emunot Vede’ot (HBV), an interesting change as it suggests a subjective evaluation amongst different beliefs and opinions. It also seems to give legitimacy to other opinions giving preference to the one proposed in this book. I am not sure at this point what to make of it.

Each section discusses a different theological subject beginning with creation, followed by Divine Unity, Mitzvot and so on. The sefer precedes Rambam’s MN by approximately 200 years and although written in Judeo-Arabic was well known in Europe. Although the first proper translation to Hebrew was only written in the 11^th century by R. Yehuda Ibn Tibon, a paraphrased translation was available much earlier and was used as the source for those who were interested in Resag’s thought in early medieval Europe. Along with the Resag Pirush on Sefer Yetzira, HBV was an important source for Jewish thought used by the Kalonimus family in developing the theology of the Chassidei Ashkenaz. (See Professor Joseph Dan’s magnum opus (Hebrew) Toldot Torat Hasod Ha’ivrit volumes 4 and 5). We also hear echoes of Resag in Rambam’s MN. As I continue writing about Resag’s Torah I will address these issues more.

At the beginning of the first section, which is titled “That all existents are created from nothingness” and deals with Creation, Resag makes an important statement.

“It is necessary to preface this section by clarifying that one, who speculates about the subjects [discussed] in it, is involved in matters that eyes have never seen nor were they apprehended by any of the senses. That person is trying to establish, through rational methods of thought, how things were at the beginning of time. His quest is for something very abstract and fine which he is trying to establish in his mind as it cannot be apprehended by the senses. As the person knows going in what the goal is, when he does apprehend the subject in its expected form, he may not now deny it or look for it in a different form. Knowing how things were in the past is something no human being has seen and therefore the goal is to apprehend with our minds matters of great profundity that are the farthest removed from our senses as the Chassid says about it: Far away that which was and deep, deep – who can find it? (Qohelet 7:24). So, when we conclude that things were created from nothingness and our senses have never experienced such a possibility, it is wrong for us to be thrown and back away saying how can we accept something we have never seen? After all, from the start we knew that the answer will be something that is beyond our experience. We must therefore get used to this and rejoice having found that which we were looking for.”

This is a very important point that needs to be made when dealing with speculative matters such as theology. By making claims that things can be empirically proven about matters that are not scientifically provable one ends up denigrating religion. Claiming that creation from nothingness is scientifically provable is doomed to failure. All we can say is that it is compatible with scientific theory and does not contradict it. The argument made by many of our compatriots especially those working in the kiruv movement, that the theory that explains the beginning of the universe with the Big Bang proves creation from nothingness cannot be further from the truth. All it does is deny a universe that was eternally as we know it and nothing more. It allows for various explanations as to what triggered the event including the possibility that it was triggered by God’s will, which the eternal universe theory does not, but it does not prove that before the Big Bang there was nothing. In fact there probably was a highly compressed point of matter and energy that expanded as the Big Bang occurred. We would have to go back and argue that that compressed matter and energy came into being from nothingness before the event, to argue for creation from nothingness. That argument is possible but not provable. We can accept it if it is not contradicted by science. Chances of it being contradicted are negligible as Resag points out that the answer to the question was never expected to be scientifically provable.

“I found it necessary to make this preface so that the reader of this book should not fool himself and believe that I will bring forth something from nothingness in front of his eyes. That is why I prefaced to him that if that were possible there would be no need for proofs and discussions, and we and everyone else would be in agreement about this matter requiring no further proof. Proofs and demonstrations are necessary because this matter cannot be seen nor sensed.”

Resag proceeds to argue that all theories about creation, whether those who believe in an eternal universe and all the other theories in between are all based on this kind of speculation. None argue for empirically provable theories. It is therefore incumbent to see which argument is stronger.

“After all this we [believers in creation from nothingness] trump all other believers because of the signs and wonders we experienced. Therefore hold on to these three things at every section of this book; your proofs are stronger, you have answers to all the questions of those who disagree with you and the signs of your prophets tip the scale in your favor.”

That our arguments are stronger is subjective and would not stand up alone. The second statement that we have answers to all questions is a requirement that makes or breaks our position. If the question would have no answer, if it would contradict reality or empirical scientific fact, our position could not be maintained. It would be completely disproven. If on the other hand it does not contradict reality, it can stand. But the basis for our defending this position so strongly even though it is not empirically provable is because we experienced through our prophets things that support this position. The wonders we experienced demonstrate that the world was created by God who has will and therefore was responsible for creation in time which allows for creation from nothingness. However, we must accept that wonders by themselves are not sufficient proof for creation from nothingness. It is not the same as us seeing something coming from nothingness with our own eyes which would not require any further proof. We still have to develop arguments and proofs to support the positions these prophetic wonders point to.

Resag with this statement has laid down a process that one needs to follow to develop a proper knowledge of theological truths. We start with the text, the prophetic position as presented by the prophet. We then make sure that the prophetic idea is indeed well understood by checking its viability in the real world. Is it compatible with reality and scientific theory? If yes then we still have to compare the arguments for our belief with those for the different beliefs and make sure that our arguments are strong enough to allow to, even if subjectively, consider them superior. It is only after proceeding through these steps that one can say that we have demonstrated the viability and truth of our theology and that we really understand it.

I have written about this many times in the past quoting Rambam on the same subject. Resag makes the same point as he starts his work on theology. A seeker must be anchored in reality and having unrealistic expectations is counterproductive. This is most difficult to those who are mathematically inclined and are accustomed to the proofs and demonstrations used in mathematical and scientific investigations. Theology requires a different set of tools and the reader must be forewarned.

A Poetic Presentation of The Active Intellect - A Poetic Description In Mishlei According To Rav Sa'adyah Gaon.

2011-05-27T16:44:00.001-04:00

The concept of Sechel Hapoel – Active Intellect is difficult to grasp for us who no longer accept Aristotelian philosophy. I came across a comment of Resag on a verse in Mishlei Chapter 8 quoted in a note by Rav Kafieh on Hanivchar Be’emunot Vede’ot (HBV) which I think is very helpful and also presents the concept in Jewish terms.

כב יְהוָה--קָנָנִי, רֵאשִׁית דַּרְכּוֹ: קֶדֶם מִפְעָלָיו מֵאָז.	22 The LORD created me at the outset of His way, the first of His works of old.
כג מֵעוֹלָם, נִסַּכְתִּי מֵרֹאשׁ-- מִקַּדְמֵי-אָרֶץ.	23 In remote eons I was shaped at the start of the first things of earth.
כד בְּאֵין-תְּהֹמוֹת חוֹלָלְתִּי; בְּאֵין מַעְיָנוֹת, נִכְבַּדֵּי-מָיִם.	24 When there were no deeps, I was spawned; when there were no fountains abounding with water.
כה בְּטֶרֶם הָרִים הָטְבָּעוּ; לִפְנֵי גְבָעוֹת חוֹלָלְתִּי.	25 Before the mountains were anchored down, before hills I was spawned;
כו עַד-לֹא עָשָׂה, אֶרֶץ וְחוּצוֹת; וְרֹאשׁ, עַפְרוֹת תֵּבֵל.	26 He had not yet made earth and open land, and the world’s first clods of soil.
כז בַּהֲכִינוֹ שָׁמַיִם, שָׁם אָנִי; בְּחֻקוֹ חוּג, עַל-פְּנֵי תְהוֹם.	27 When He established the heavens, I was there; when He set a circle upon the face of the deep,
כח בְּאַמְּצוֹ שְׁחָקִים מִמָּעַל; בַּעֲזוֹז, עִינוֹת תְּהוֹם.	28 When He made firm the skies above, when the fountains of the deep showed their might,
כט בְּשׂוּמוֹ לַיָּם, חֻקּוֹ, וּמַיִם, לֹא יַעַבְרוּ-פִיו; בְּחוּקוֹ, מוֹסְדֵי אָרֶץ.	29 When He gave to the sea His decree, that the waters should not transgress His commandment, when He appointed the foundations of the earth;
ל וָאֶהְיֶה אֶצְלוֹ, אָמוֹן: וָאֶהְיֶה שַׁעֲשׁוּעִים, יוֹם יוֹם; מְשַׂחֶקֶת לְפָנָיו בְּכָל-עֵת.	30 And I was by Him, an intimate; I was His delight day after day, playing before Him at all times,
לא מְשַׂחֶקֶת, בְּתֵבֵל אַרְצוֹ; וְשַׁעֲשֻׁעַי, אֶת-בְּנֵי אָדָם.	31 Playing in the world, His earth and my delight with humankind {P}

(Full Disclosure: Though I copied the above from Mechon Mamre, I edited the English translation wherever I thought it would help for clarity using the Robert Alter excellent translation of the Books of Wisdom. I did not accept his suggested alterations to the Masoretic text.)

These verses are part of a series of short essays about Chochma – wisdom. Resag in his Pirush explains as follows:

“If we consider, as logic dictates and the verses clarify, that the Creator made everything with wisdom and considering that [creation is] complete and perfect, we can accept as true the prophet’s declaration that she [wisdom], must have preceded all creation.”

Resag is explaining that the verse is indeed suggesting that wisdom existed before anything physical. This understanding of the verse conforms to the Midrash Breishit Rabah that illustrates the idea by suggesting that God looked into the Torah using it as a blueprint to create the world.

“That is so because everything was created thanks to wisdom and she was there at the first instant of time when it came into existence, for time itself was created through wisdom.”

The science, the concepts that underlie all things that exist can be visualized as a separate entity that must precede everything that comes into being if not in time at least hierarchically. Time itself is one such existent brought into being by wisdom.

“Although wisdom itself does not really exist independently, it is however a necessary component of every creation that God created. [The prophet] then lists the actions [of the seven days] of creation. He describes the first day with מִקַּדְמֵי-אָרֶץ and בַּהֲכִינוֹ שָׁמַיִם – [the creation of heaven and earth]. The separation of the waters [on the second day is alluded to] with בְּחֻקוֹ חוּג, עַל-פְּנֵי תְהוֹם. Let the waters gather creating the seas [of the third day] with בְּשׂוּמוֹ לַיָּם, חֻקּוֹ. Let there be lights in the vaults of the heaven [of the fourth day] with בְּאַמְּצוֹ שְׁחָקִים מִמָּעַל…. Wisdom now declares with pride and says “And I was by Him, an intimate” for she is the tool He uses to innovate all that He innovates, using her to create, bring forth and into existence everything. [The prophet] also depicts metaphorically that wisdom rejoices daily, because she is present for everything that is created on a daily basis, renewing herself and rejoicing with every moment of time as it continuously comes into existence. That is so because she is the essence of every creation and every split moment of time.”

As the prophet contemplates the world around him, he perceives the boundless wisdom that underlies every little component of that world. He marvels at how they all interact with each other insuring their collective continued existence. Even time itself, the measurement of change of the physical world, is essentially a function of that same wisdom. The prophet sees that wisdom as the connector between the world and its Creator as it is His wisdom that underlies every bit of existence. He metaphorically describes wisdom as basking in the results of its plans, seeing itself as an intimate of both the Creator and His creations.

“She [wisdom] then deciphers the metaphor. She says, “When I suggested that I rejoiced, I did not mean I myself did so for I am not an entity. I was talking about my friends and surroundings - “Playing in the world, His earth”. When I said that I was playing, I did not refer to my own essence for I do not have any essence; I was talking about those who deserve me and possess me namely humankind”. All this is an expression of praise and glory of the wise men, for their deeds are deeds that [perpetuate] existence.”

Wisdom is the connector between man and God through God’s creation. God’s wisdom permeates everything including man, and the wise man in his self-awareness, perceives that wisdom, internalizes it and acts according to that wisdom in a constructive manner.

I think that this is a beautiful and masterful description of the Sechel Hapoel – the Active Intellect.

Shabbat Shalom.

Yediah And Emunah - Resag On Belief and Demonstration -

2011-05-20T05:35:00.001-04:00

I started reading Hanivchar Be’emunot Vede’ot (HBV) by Rav Sa’adyah Gaon (Resag). It is a most rewarding experience which I will try to share as I come across ideas that captivate me. HBV was written in Arabic about two years after Resag wrote his commentary on Sefer Yetzira. Resag’s style is to support everything he proposes, directly from Tanach, quoting and then interpreting verses extensively. Resag also composed the Tafsir, a translation into Arabic of Tanach, accompanied by a full commentary. Not all the commentary is available but a lot of work is ongoing in reconstructing from where it is quoted by others to complement the extant parts of the commentary. Resag’s interpretations of verses are original and the comments on verses in the HBV are many times complementary to the Pirush, at others novel.

Note: I want to caution that these posts are written before I had a chance to read the whole sefer. I read it years ago and referred back to chapters and subjects many times in the last few years, but this is the first systematic read in a long time. My comments should therefore be taken with caution and I have a feeling my opinions and understanding of Resag may change as I go along.

Here is a segment in the introduction discussing belief and knowledge. (Translation is mine from Rav Kafieh’s Hebrew translation of the original Arabic).

“Know you who are reading this book, May God grant you grace, that the rationale for studying and exploring matters related to our beliefs is to fulfill two goals. One is so that we can verify in actu through [demonstrated] knowledge that which we already know as taught to us by God’s prophets and the second is so that we can refute any that argue against us in matters of our beliefs. God informed us through His prophets, all that we need to know regarding our beliefs, authenticating their prophecy through signs and portents, and thereafter commanded us that we demonstrate [logically for ourselves] these matters and remember them. He also told us that our study and exploration would lead us to verify all that we were told by His messengers giving us assurances that it is impossible for those who argue against us to contradict our religion or those [among us] who have doubts about our beliefs to argue against our beliefs.”

In the preceding segment, Resag showed that there is a religious obligation to demonstrate for ourselves through logical arguments that which we are commanded to believe and ignore the cautionary warnings of those who worry that speculation may lead to heresy. He now explains that this fear is not only unfounded but shows a lack of confidence that our beliefs are indeed true. If we accept the scriptures and their authors as God’s prophets authenticated by their performance of “signs and portents”, we should feel secure that no one could prove us wrong. I find it interesting that Resag melds the two – co-religionists who have doubts and followers of other religions who argue against our religion – assuring us that should they honestly look for the truth they will find that our beliefs are true and will stand up to all scrutiny. Resag then uses Yeshayahu 44:6-8 in support of his argument which he interprets as follows -

ח אַל-תִּפְחֲדוּ, וְאַל-תִּרְהוּ--הֲלֹא מֵאָז הִשְׁמַעְתִּיךָ וְהִגַּדְתִּי, וְאַתֶּם עֵדָי; הֲיֵשׁ אֱלוֹהַּ מִבַּלְעָדַי, וְאֵין צוּר בַּל-יָדָעְתִּי.

8 Do not be frightened do not be shaken! Have I not from old predicted to you? I foretold and you are My witnesses. Is there any god then but me? There is no other rock; I know none!

“He [Yeshayahu in the name of God] said; do not be afraid from the numbers and strength of your opponents …. Do not be shaken by the essence of their arguments and of their proofs, consider that I predicted to you future occurrences and told[1] you of past happenings…. He then said “you are My witnesses”, referring to the signs, marvels and great portents that they experienced …. He then said, “Is there any god then but me?” meaning that should you at times wonder about some of the past and the future events I shared with you, thinking that they were not so. That fear would be warranted were I not the sole creator, allowing you to wonder whether I knew all the details. However, [that cannot be the case] considering that I am one and alone, My knowledge encompasses everything that I did and will do. He furthermore said, “There is no rock I know not”[2], included in that [word צוּר] are the respected people and the wise amongst them as the word צוּר is used [allegorically] for respected people for example …. He tells us with this that as God knows all wise and respected men and all that they know, it is therefore impossible that they should come up with anything that would disprove your beliefs and laws considering that I [God] know all and I am the one who told you all this. It is from this perspective that we explore and study [logically demonstrate] that which our Creator has told us”.

The argument seems to be circular. God tells us about the past, namely that the world is not eternal, that it was created and the reason we believe that is so, is because He is the sole Creator and therefore knows all! Also, the last sentence requires some clarification; what does he mean by this apparently a priori perspective? However, before dealing with that Resag appears to digress and asks –

“If all religious matters as told to us by God, are demonstrable through correct research and exploration, what is the wisdom of Him informing us through prophecy authenticated by physical rather than rational proofs? The answer is that the Wise One knows that knowledge acquired through study requires a lot of time and had he left it up to us to learn [these truths], we would have remained ignorant for a long time. Indeed, many would never reach a resolution because of their handicaps, some for lack of ability while others would become mired in uncertainty and questions. For that reason, God relieved us from this responsibility, sending us His messenger informing us [of these truths], showing us unquestionable signs and portents, ones that cannot be denied as it says “you saw that I spoke with you from heaven” (Shemot 20:22). He also spoke with His messenger in front of our eyes, compelling us to believe in him always as it says …. We were therefore required to accept these religious matters and all they encompass immediately, relying on what our senses experienced, compelling us to accept this reliable transmission. We were then commanded to study [these matters] at our own speed until we demonstrate logically to ourselves [these truths].”

Resag addresses the obvious question first. If these theological truths are demonstrable, and that must be so if there is an obligation to demonstrate these beliefs to ourselves, why then did God present them to us as matters of belief? Why did He not let us work them out on our own? As Rav Kafieh notes, Rambam in MN 1:34 follows the same line of reasoning and offers a similar answer. If everyone were required to establish philosophical truths starting from scratch, starting as a tabula rasa without even a foreseeable endpoint, most of us would never get to the truth. We are therefore told where our speculation, if performed carefully and thoroughly, will lead us to and commanded to accept these truths at first on Moshe’s say so with the expectation that in time we will demonstrate to ourselves their veracity.

The next question that comes to mind is that we are asked to spend a lifetime following a strict set of rules that cover every aspect of one’s life and work to overcome personal biases with the goal that one speculate towards a foregone conclusion. How is one to know that at the end of the road he will not discover that all this was a lie and a life, nay lives were wasted?

This is where “signs and portents” play their role. They authenticate the prophecy by confirming that the source of the message is God who should know the Truth considering He is the Creator of everything. It gives the seeker a certain amount of psychic comfort and confidence to know that the end goal he is seeking comes from an impeccable source. However, theology dependent on revelation-based belief should only be transitory until the seeker develops personal convictions using logical processes. Because without that a person that uses his God given brains cannot shake off a kernel of doubt. As Rambam says in Hilchot Yesodei Hatorah 8:1 שהמאמין על פי האותות--יש בליבו דופי, שאפשר שייעשה האות בלאט וכישוף

“One whose beliefs are based on signs cannot avoid having doubts. Those signs could be a sleight of hand or magic.” Skepticism is healthy.

Although Resag does not spell it out here, but taking into account his understanding of what a reliable demonstration consists of, as discussed elsewhere in HBV, I think that he holds that beliefs have to be tested against reality - if they do not contradict reality, we can accept them as true. That is how I read the end of the first piece I translated above “it is impossible for those who argue against us to contradict our religion or those [among us] who have doubts about our beliefs to argue against our beliefs.” I will talk more about his position on demonstration in the future.

Here again we see Resag aligned pretty much with the thought we see in Rambam.

[1] Resag translates וְהִגַּדְתִּי – literally as I told, not foretold as in JPS translation

[2] Resag translates, וְאֵין צוּר בַּל-יָדָעְתִּי differently then JPS

Created Light in Rav Sa'adyah Gaon's Commentary to Sefer Yetzirah

2011-05-05T19:44:00.000-04:00

In an earlier post, I quoted Rav Sa’adyah Gaon (Resag) explaining the concept of creation presented by Sefer Yetzira (SY) as words and numbers being etched in air thus creating things. At the time I suggested that “air” is a stand in for “space” and I also pointed out that, Resag cautions us not to take these images literally. They are only concepts that SY translates into something we humans can perceive in our mind. As I read on in SY, in Perek 4 Mishna 1 Resag returns to the subject of air/space in more detail and introduces the concept of “created matter”, – Davar Nivra - which was subsequently discussed by Rambam in MN as “created light” – Ohr Nivra. I believe this will shed a new light on Rambam’s usage of the term and its meaning.

Note: the following quotes are my English translation of a Hebrew translation of an Arabic translation. Rav Kafieh in his usual thorough way has given us a formidable tool. SY original is Hebrew. Resag translated it into Arabic. Rav Kafieh translated the Arabic back into Hebrew. The Hebrew translation of the Arabic translation is not identical to the original Hebrew. We witness the obvious: translations are interpretations and we cannot always rely on one to give us the true intention of the original. A caution to those who come to definite conclusions about the author’s intentions based on translations e.g. MN and Pirush Hamishna for one. Here is the original Mishna[1] and my translation of the R. Kafieh retranslated Resag translation.

עשר ספירות בלימה, אחת רוח אלקים חיים חי עולמים נכון כסאו מאז, ברוך ומבורך שמו תמיד לעולם ועד. וזו היא רוח הקדש,

“Parallel to the ten defined numbers, first there is the living God’s will, the life(force) of the worlds whose throne is there from beginning to end, blessed be His name forever. That is the holy will.”

Note how Resag translates “Ruach” – will. Resag then proceeds to explain that the numbers that are visualized as the tools used in the creation of the universe are there because of the will of the living God - רוח אלקים חיים. The idea is that there was no physical activity on the part of God other than His willing things into existence. Resag explains:

“Saying these three things about the Creator - חי עולמים נכון כסאו מאז, ברוך ומבורך שמו -

imparts a great secret. That is, it is telling us how we should visualize in our minds the existence of God, by using a metaphor as an approximation but not as [a] corporeal [depiction]. SY suggests that we visualize the relationship of God to the world just as we see the life force in its relationship to a living thing. We could therefore say metaphorically that He is the life force of the universe. From that, we can now move to the next level, the level of the intellect, and refer to Him as the intellect of the universe. The idea is to help us understand that a living thing, especially one who thinks, its body is more naturally refined [adin in Hebrew.] and more advanced than other bodies [e.g. plants or inanimate objects- DG], allowing for a life force to attach itself to it. That life force can now sustain an intellect, because the life force is more refined than the body and the intellect is more refined than the life force. This conclusion leads us to visualizing that air, which is simple and refined, is the substance in which God’s will, namely His ability, spreads creating in it and giving it mobility just as the life force gives mobility to the body. The Creator is present in all this just as the intellect is present in the life force, directing it. Therefore, the closest metaphor for Him is that He is the intellect of the universe. Just as the intellect is not divisible even if the body is, so too the Creator is indivisible, even if the universe should divide. Just as the intellect does not die when the body dies so too the Creator would not cease to exist should the universe cease to. Just like the intellect, although is part of the soul, it is superior directing it, so too the Creator, although He is found in everything, He is superior over all and everything is directed by him. And just as the intellect permeates every part of the body, every bone, ligament, every dense matter, all are impacted by its direction so too the Creator is found in everything; no mountain, sea, or dense entity is without Him, just like air is everywhere… With these metaphors, the opinions of the believers will be strengthened in accepting that God is everywhere… that He watches over mankind’s actions… that He hearkens to every prayer for He is with the supplicant[2]…”

We humans cannot apprehend something that is completely abstract. For us to recognize something as existent we have to visualize it in our terms. Without that, we will always question whether the entity we deduced logically or intuitively to exist, really does exist. SY is teaching us how to accomplish this by offering visualizations of God in a metaphorical sense; comparing His existence to the most abstract thing we know - our intellect. Just as our intellect resides in us so too do we place God’s will, the result of which we can perceive by looking at our environment, in air that permeates everything around us. The “air” Resag uses in this metaphor so far is the real air that surrounds us, the one we breathe.

“We focused our [minds until now on the] idea that God is found everywhere using the palpable air we are surrounded by [as a metaphor]. We now [turn to] the even more refined “air” but also only as an approximation and allegory and not in a corporeal or exact perspective. The Scriptures refer to this second refined “air” as glory, “His glory fills the whole earth” (Yeshayahu 11:2) … The nation refers to it as Shechinah … and the author of this book refers to it as רוח אלקים חיים – the will of the living God… It is through this second refined “air” that the words of prophecy are brought and all the wonders are revealed to the prophets…. That is a “created thing” without doubt for anything that is not God is created.”

Resag is systematically leading us to accept the existence of an entity that is physically non-existent. He takes us to the limits of physicality and then tells us that this “refined air” is only imaginary, “an approximation and allegory”. In other words, when we use the words glory, Shechinah or anything similar as it relates to God, It is nothing but a mental visualization. We picture a presence as a proxy for God not that God has place and thus presence. The “created thing” is a creation of our imagination, a visualization that allows us to conceive the “existence” of such an entity. Having visualized this “created thing” or “created light” we can now conceive a connection between that unknowable and unreachable entity and us.

“And it is with this second refined air which is to the world as is the life force to man, that Moshe heard the “created words” in the visible air which is referred to as “the voice of the living God” (Devarim 5:23)…. And from it comes the knowledge of wisdom that God grants to His chosen…. It also is the source of courage and strength that God grants to the ones He wants to [grant]…”

The way I understand Resag is that in the process of speculation about God and creation, we humans create in our minds certain pictures that help us actualize abstract concepts. We have to be careful and keep in mind that we are visualizing “created things”, “created lights” and hearing “created sounds”. We are seeing things created in our mind and although the experience is so intense that it appears real, it is no more than a mental vision. That is why he emphasizes several times that all these descriptions of “created things” are “an approximation and allegory”.

I know that in other writings Resag comes across differently. It would appear in those places that he believes that God creates light, sound and entities to represent Him, a quite difficult idea to swallow, at least to me; here he is quite clear that it is only visualization. The commentary on SY was written about two years before his Emunot Vede’ot, according to Rav Kafieh, and was written for a more sophisticated audience, the reader of SY. I feel comfortable reading it as a standalone, presenting his undiluted opinion. With this in mind, I also understand why Rambam accepts the concept in numerous places in MN although he insists at the same time that no physicality can be adduced to God. The preferred approach would be “negative apprehension” – Yediah Shelilit – but as a less sophisticated alternative, “created light” is acceptable.

[1] It is also important to know that SY comes in a variety of different versions with quite marked variances. I adapted here to the version used by Resag. The different versions also have different numbering of chapters and mishnot.

[2] This reminds me of Rambam in MN 3;52 “Man does not sit, move, and occupy himself when he is alone in his house, as he sits, moves and occupies himself when he is in the presence of a great king…”

Early Impressions On Sefer Yetzira with Commentary of Rav Sa'adyah Gaon.

2011-04-24T15:42:00.000-04:00

I am still working my way through Sefer Yetzira (SY) with the commentary of Rav Sa’adyah Gaon (Resag) and here are some of my early impressions and thoughts.

Resag explains SY as a philosophical treatise on Jewish theology based on an Aristotelian concept of physics and metaphysics. I am not well versed enough in the different schools of Aristotelian thought extant during the Middle Ages, to identify into which school Resag placed the SY – but I know enough to recognize the general concepts. For example, in the third chapter SY talks about the various letter combinations and the number of combinations possible with words of different sizes. Resag explains it as a representation of the variables that result from the combination of the basic substances Air, Water, Fire, and Earth and derivatives thereof. In another place, he interprets SY as discussing the natural position of the substances. This type of discussion is one of the central themes of SY according to Resag. A reader of SY who is steeped in Aristotelian thought would understand it this way without too much trouble even though it is written in a much-abbreviated form containing many code words.
Considering the above and knowing that Resag lived in 882/92 to 942 and the fact that he places the authorship of SY to the same time the Mishna was composed and written, Greek philosophy and Judaism are quite old friends. Resag believed that the Tannaim already had a tradition of rationalizing religion and seeing it from a rational perspective. Even if SY was written later than Resag suggests, it apparently was already accepted and canonized at his time. Consequently, it must have been authored, at the latest, during the era of the early Geonim or late Amoraim.
Clearly, Rambam was not an innovator when he explained Judaism rationally and in concert with the science of his time. This was an accepted way of thinking going back to antiquity. It does not take away from the greatness of his work and the thoroughness and completeness of thought he presents. It however mutes the criticism leveled against him that he was misguided by the Greeks. On the contrary, he was doing what Jews were doing for generations while his detractors had lost touch with their tradition.
SY accepts astrology as science. Resag clearly does not. In fact the way he puts it when he explains the astrological propositions, “This, God will make you understand, is the central theme of the author of this book”. At the end of the presentation, he closes by saying “I expand on this so much only because the author of this book has made it the central theme of his work”. Rav Kafieh notes that in his introduction to Iyov, Resag comments that astrology is a plain theory that has no basis in reality other than being a theory.
Resag has no problem disagreeing with a book that apparently was widely accepted as authentic to the point that it had a tradition of being written by Avraham Avinu. At the same time, he finds it valuable to write a commentary to it and accept those things he finds worthwhile. He indeed sees it as a precursor to the theology presented by the Torah. The torah accepted some of these ideas and rejected others, adding its own theology.

I just wanted to share some thoughts for the upcoming Chag.

Chag Sameach.

Defining the Unknowable.

2011-04-17T14:40:00.001-04:00

In my last post, I discussed Rav Sa’adyah Gaon’s understanding in his Pirush on Sefer Yetzira on the limits of human knowledge. The question then comes to mind, if humans cannot aspire to apprehend what I refer to as the “whys” of existence how are we to understand Sefer Yetzira, which is attempting to explain that same unknowable?

“Should one ask, considering that Iyov, Agur (the author of the Mishlei verses that support Resag’s position] say clearly that this [knowledge] is unknowable and Moshe Rabbeinu indicates that he agrees, how could Avraham [the author of the ideas in Sefer Yetzira] argue that he arrived at this knowledge? Our answer is that Avraham did not argue that he arrived at a true understanding of the process of creation. He just described how he imagined in his mind the appearance [coming into being][1] of existence [literally: the created]. This is just like we, the members of the communities of monotheists, picture in our minds that He created things not from something while at the same time we cannot understand how something can be created from nothingness. So too he [Avraham] pictured that as words [speech to be exact] parted space[2] and [simultaneously] their [word’s] letters formed, drawings were drawn producing forms that were differentiated from each other. Some of these drawings and forms gathered parts from space and as they were squeezed, Water was formed. Some of these parts lifted up the water leaving behind a matter that looked like detritus which became Earth. Some heated Space making it brittle and sharp thus forming Fire. All these are the Creators actions not ours, just as to our mind, creation is for His sake not for ours.”

In other words, although we know that there is no way that, a human being can understand God and His actions; it still is a religious necessity to try to depict in our minds, using human points of reference, the act of creation. That is how we humans are able to internalize creation from complete nothingness. To do that, Avraham tried to picture the process in his mind using familiar human terms, knowing full well that the actions of God are totally other.

The last few words - just as to our mind, creation is for His sake not for ours – are exactly how Rambam in a discussion of the purpose for existence, explains in MN 3:13 the verse in Mishlei 16:4 –

ד כֹּל פָּעַל יְהוָה, לַמַּעֲנֵהוּ; וְגַם-רָשָׁע, לְיוֹם רָעָה.

“Thus it says: The Lord has made everything lama’anehu [for His sake or for its sake] where the third person may refer to the complement [everything][3]. If however it refers to the subject, the interpretation of the word would be: for the sake of His essence, may He be exalted – that is, for the sake of His will, as the latter is His essence …”

Apparently, Resag concurs that we cannot know the purpose of creation. All we can say is that He willed it with wisdom which is one with Him.

The ten numbers - 0 to 9 - take on great significance in Sefer Yetzira. Both the letters and numbers are slowly developed as we continue reading Sefer Yetzira and explained by Resag, into multiple forms used to depict existence and its relation to God. Here is the first introduction to this system.

Aristotles proposes ten categories that define all that exists. The following is quoted in Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_(Aristotle)

“Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being-affected. To give a rough idea, examples of substance are man, horse; of quantity: four-foot, five foot; of qualification: white, grammatical; of a relative: double, half, larger; of where: in the Lyceum, in the market-place; of when: yesterday, last-year; of being-in-a-position: is-lying, is-sitting; of having: has-shoes-on, has armor on; of doing: cutting, burning; of being-affected: being-cut, being-burned.”

Resag after listing the ten categories as above explains –

“Once the wise men defined these ten categories, nothing that can be known in the universe has been excluded except for the Creator, who is beyond any category or spatial limits.”

Interestingly, similar to Rambam Resag holds that one must know well the physical to know what God is not. He however goes one-step further and says that Sefer Yetzira lists ten names of God, to contrast with the ten physical categories. Resag thus presents a level of apprehension that cannot accept complete unknowability. In fact, that was Avraham Avinu’s level of apprehension of God that was improved on by Moshe Rabbeinu, giving us absolute negative knowledge.

Tying this in with the Pessach theme, may I suggest that the number 10 has significance in the ten Makot and subsequently, at the culmination of the Exodus story – the Ten Commandments. I will discuss some of this in future posts.

I would like to end with the following thought. Man has to accept that there are things that are unknowable and approach those issues with humility. At the same time, we have to define the unknowable. For that, we need to understand our reality and the way it is. All that knowledge is part of Torah as it is the only way we can come close to God by understanding the Ultimate Unknown that He is – indeed that is the goal of Torah and Mitzvot.

Chag Kasher Vesameach to all.

[1] Rav Kafieh in a footnote understands this to mean that he was imagining the development of the substances from the original matter and the whole of creation from those substances. Based on the next sentence, I think Resag is suggesting that Avraham imagined the unknowable namely creation from nothingness.

[2] Rav Kafieh translated Avir = air. However considering that Ruach = air is one of the four substances which compose matter as understood by the ancients; I think “space” makes more sense. However, supporting Rav Kafieh is the continuation where Resag discusses the formation of only three of the substances ignoring air (Ruach).

[3] Indeed, Robert Alter in his Books of Wisdom translation reads – Each act of the Lord has its own end -; even the wicked, for an evil day.

Unknowable Knowledge

2011-04-12T03:50:00.000-04:00

Continuing to read the commentary of Rav Sa’adyah Gaon (Resag) on sefer Yetzira, I was intrigued by a discussion on different types of knowledge. Sefer Yetzira refers to the subject it discusses as Pela’ot Chochma – wondrous knowledge. Resag discusses at length the meaning of these words.

“And I propose that there are two types of knowledge - one is the kind that human beings can grasp; another is one they cannot. The one they cannot grasp, is to know how things came into being, how the wise Creator made them, existents from non-existents and how He instilled into each of the substances [the four basic ones: fire, air, water and earth -DG] the nature that is observed in it. This is knowledge that one cannot find a way to aspire to nor to [ever] arrive at. All wise men found honor in admitting their lack of knowledge in this matter as Iyov says…. He [Iyov] then informed that this knowledge which the wise acknowledge to be hidden from them is the nature of the substances and their uniqueness. For were we to ask the wisest of the wise, “do you know why the nature of fire is to rise, the nature of water to go below, the nature of air to be ungraspable and the nature of earth to sink?” His only answer would be that that is how they were created and that is the nature that was instilled into them…. “

The way I understand it is that knowing and observing nature is not the knowledge that is hidden from us. It is to understand why nature acts the way it does, why the laws of nature are this way and not different, why a different alternative law of nature would not work, is the elusive knowledge. Rambam makes a similar argument in MN 3:13, as part of a discussion about the purpose of Creation and existence. Rambam refutes the popularly accepted notion that everything was created for humankind so that it exists to serve God.

“…It is likewise thought that the finality of all that exists is solely the existence of the human species so that it would worship God, and that all that has been made, has been made for it alone…. However if this opinion is carefully examined, as opinions ought to be carefully examined by intelligent men, the flaw in it becomes clear…. The final end being the existence of man, is the Creator able to bring him into existence without all these preliminaries, or was it possible for him to be brought into existence only after they were carried out?”

The question is also could humanity exist with a different set of natural laws? Why is the universe the way it is? The answer Rambam finally gives, and is the only answer for those who accept an eternal universe,

“Necessarily and obligatorily the argument must end with the answer being given that the final end is: God has wished it so, or: His wisdom has required this to be so.”

Of course, the limits of where human knowledge ends keeps on being pushed back as we understand our universe and its workings better, but we know that certain questions, what I call the “whys” of existence, will never be explained away. Those answers can only be addressed by theology.

Resag uses a series of verses in Iyov and Mishlei to support his argument. Depicting the difficulty in grasping this kind of knowledge, he quotes Iyov 28:20-22,

כ וְהַחָכְמָה, מֵאַיִן תָּבוֹא; וְאֵי זֶה, מְקוֹם בִּינָה.	20 Whence then cometh wisdom? And where is the place of understanding?
כא וְנֶעֶלְמָה, מֵעֵינֵי כָל-חָי; וּמֵעוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם נִסְתָּרָה.	21 Seeing it is hid from the eyes of all living, and kept close from the fowls of the air.
כב אֲבַדּוֹן וָמָוֶת, אָמְרוּ; בְּאָזְנֵינוּ, שָׁמַעְנוּ שִׁמְעָהּ.	22 Destruction and Death say: 'We have heard a rumor thereof with our ears.'

On the last verse, Resag makes an interesting comment.

“His reference to destruction and death, namely someone who has died and is lost to us, his path in this knowledge is no different then our own path. One should not presume that the earlier generations, those who already died, had a greater apprehension of that knowledge.”

We are brought up on the idea that the earlier sages knew more about how things are than we do. There is a quasi-mystical certainty that the early sages, those closer to Sinai and Creation knew more about the “whys” of things than we do. Resag dissuades us from this notion.

Like Rambam, he arrives at the same conclusion, continuing with the above verses.

“Having summarized how elevated this knowledge is from humans, he [Iyov] turns to God who is Exalted saying

כג אֱלֹהִים, הֵבִין דַּרְכָּהּ; וְהוּא, יָדַע אֶת-מְקוֹמָהּ.

23 God understands the way thereof, and He knows the place thereof.

When he says that God knows its ways and location, he is not suggesting that knowledge is a substance that is located in a specific place and that God knows that place, for it is negated that wisdom and its place be two things in addition to the Creator. Having said [allegorically] that a human cannot know the way to it or its location; he reversed it for God saying He does know them. The meaning is that this knowledge belongs to Him, He is its source; it is He.”

Resag’s question and answer follows very much the same path Rambam used.

“In the verses,

כד כִּי-הוּא, לִקְצוֹת-הָאָרֶץ יַבִּיט; תַּחַת כָּל-הַשָּׁמַיִם יִרְאֶה.	24 For He looks to the ends of the earth, and sees under the whole heaven;
כה לַעֲשׂוֹת לָרוּחַ מִשְׁקָל; וּמַיִם, תִּכֵּן בְּמִדָּה.	25 When He makes a weight for the wind, and metes out the waters by measure.

He includes the four substances Air, Water, Earth and Fire to tell us that He created these substances and instilled their particular unique nature with such wisdom that no man can aspire to apprehend it.”

Rambam in Hilchot Yesodei Hatorah and in many places in MN talks about the two kinds of knowledge, Ma’aseh Breishit and Ma’aseh Merkavah as esoteric subjects that have to be taught with caution. I was always bothered why Ma’aseh Breishit, which traditionally is understood to refer to the sciences, should be restricted. In fact, Rambam in other places argues that the sciences are the basic stepping-stones to knowledge of God. In view of the above, I believe that a reassessment of the parameters of what Ma’aseh Breishit is is needed. I am sure I will come back to this theme.

Chag Kasher Vesameach to all.

Resag and The Authorship of Sefer Yetzirah. Avraham Avinu May Have Been Wrong!

2011-04-01T05:45:00.001-04:00

Rav Sa’adyah Gaon here, is known as the author of Emunot Vede’ot an early and probably the first Jewish philosophical work written in the middle ages. Less known is that he was also the author of an Arabic translation and commentary on the Sefer Yetzira. Traditionally, Sefer Yetzira is thought to be a mystical/kabalistic book transmitted from antiquity attributed to Avraham Avinu. Rav Sa’adyah (Resag) explains it in a philosophical rationalist way. I got interested in it through reading a chapter in Yosef Dan’s History of Kabbalah where he dissects Resag’s commentary. Rav Kafieh Z”L, the great and prolific Yemmenite scholar and writer, translated the commentary into Hebrew and made it accessible to a contemporary reader. I started reading it and if I have the fortitude and perseverance will continue to do so and comment as I come across interesting subjects. As a start I will translate a short segment in the introduction which I find fascinating and again illustrates how close-minded and far we have come from our great medieval Halachists and thinkers.

Sefer Yetzira deals with creation as the name suggests. It discusses the transition from absolute nothingness to existence. Resag explains that it does not discuss science as we know it but how science came into existence. It is not metaphysics which deals with the non-physical; it is also not physics which attempts to understand physical existence. It attempts to understand what we would call in modern parlance the moment of the “Big Bang”. As I was reading this, I had an insight about how Resag understands Ma’aseh Breishit as opposed to Ma’aseh Merkavah from one side and Physics from the other. Ma’aseh Breishit is the divider or rather the transition from one to the other. I am not sure if Rambam agrees with that though I have a hunch he may. I will have to think further about that as I read further. Sorry, I am digressing.

In the introduction, Resag presents nine different theories about how the world came into existence starting from the Aristotelian eternal universe ending with the Torah creation from nothingness and every other rational possibility in between. The eighth theory argues for God creating what he calls “air” and placing “numbers” and “words” in it. The idea is that everything can be described mathematically considering everything physical has substance that can be represented by numbers while the concept that holds things together is represented by words. This is the idea described in Sefer Yetzira and Resag suggests that as we read on we will get a clearer picture. I will come back to this in a separate post as Resag gives a very interesting insight on what occurred at Sinai. The ninth theory, is what Resag calls the Torah approach and the correct one which holds that physical existence came into being in one leap without the intermediate period of “air”, “numbers” and “words”. This theory accepts that there are “numbers” and “words” but they are part of existence as we know it rather that the cause for existence. The cause for existence is God and we do not know, nor can we ever know, how that transition from nothingness to existence came about.

This presentation indicates that the proponent of the eighth theory, namely the author of Sefer Yetzira, though not wrong intrinsically, is however wrong conceptually. In other words, his concept of creation is lacking as he conflates process with actuality. Now comes the surprising and shocking to some, very instructive to others, part which I will translate verbatim (almost).

“Having presented these nine theories…. We will now complete the introduction to this book by commenting on the tradition that we received from the ancients as well as it is noted at the end of this book itself, that Avraham Avinu authored this book, and that once he understood God appeared to him. They are not suggesting that he [Avraham] set down the words [orally or to paper] in this form but rather that he developed these ideas [concepts] in his mind, establishing that words and numbers are the source of everything as we will explain [in the book and commentary]. He taught these ideas to himself and to his monotheistic followers. These were transmitted continuously orally within our nation [community], just as the Mishna was transmitted orally and unwritten and as parts of the Scriptures were transmitted orally, for example Shlomo’s parables which were copied by Chizkyahu the Judean king and his people. At the time that the nation’s sages gathered to collect the ideas [concepts] of the Mishna and attach their own words to them thus setting them down so too did they do with the concepts of this book. That is why we find [in this book] some verses and this [specific] order. (I am not sure what these last few words mean – DG). The place this book was written is Eretz Israel, as the letters are based on their language where there are two Dalets and so on and Resh with a Dagesh and without as is their custom.”

I find this fascinating especially in view of the traditional point of view that is common in our contemporary community. First, it tells us that when a sefer is attributed to someone it means that it is based on that person’s ideas rather than authorship. But even more fascinating is that it presents Jewish theology as an evolving process. In other words, Avraham developed his own ideas about God and creation which were not necessarily complete until Sinai (see the first chapter in MT Hilchot Avodah Zara for an identical presentation and my article here for a discussion on the subject as it pertains to the apprehension of God). It is at Sinai that the completed Jewish theologies of creation was established and were put to words in the first chapters of Breishit. Avraham’s ideas were a stepping-stone to the concepts at Sinai but fell short of the true understanding of creation.

I leave you with these thoughts.

Shabbat Shalom.

Hakirah 11 Is On Its Way.

2011-03-23T20:16:00.000-04:00

Hakirah Volume 11 is ready and will be mailed in the next few days. This issue contains very exciting articles and I am sure will again exceed everybody's expectations.

You can see the list of articles and abstracts here.

Enjoy!

Miraculous Signs: Imagination or Reality?

2011-03-22T05:27:00.000-04:00

Professor Chaim Kreisel a few years ago published a “lost” (censured?) book by Rabbi Nissim of Marseilles, a 14^th century Provencal Rabbi, called Ma’aseh Nissim. The book main thrust is to explain the miracles that we find in the Torah so that they make sense in their context. The book has 14 introductory chapters (note the number 14, an important number for the Maimonidean which he was, as it is the number of books Mishne Torah has), which discuss fundamental theological issues. The author has a fabulous ability to understand allegorical verses and Midrashim and is apparently from the same school as an earlier contemporary, the author of Livyat Chen, Rabbi Levi ben Avraham (see the labels on the sidebar). The main part of the book follows the Parshyot, explaining the apparently unnatural events or laws discussed in them.

Here is a translation of a small segment in the 14^th chapter of the introduction which I saw over the weekend in passing while researching a subject I am working on. I thought it to be quite interesting and I hope you will agree.

Rabbi Nissim’ style is to organize miracles into classes and categories. One class is composed of things that occur between God and the prophet and the second class is composed of those that involve the prophet with other people. Each of the two classes can be divided into two categories: Actions taken by the prophet as instructed or knowledge of a future event. He also assigns a different class and category for each homonym used in Scriptures for miracles. The following is his understanding of a sign – Ot.

“Regarding the first category of the first class, which are the miracles and wonders that occur only between God and the prophet: Every intelligent person who pictures [in his mind] and understands the essence of how God’s speech and His instructions to the prophets [truly] work, must believe that these [miracles] are prophetic and do not happen outside the mind. They are not really happening and cannot be experienced by our external senses while our internal senses do experience them. If at times, our external senses also experience them, that experience is not real. It is imaginary. An example of such a miracle is the sign given to Avraham when the torch passed between the pieces [of the animals he cut up][1] and Gideon with the fleece of wool[2] and other similar ones. The theme is that the whole episode, the asking of a sign and the answer – the sign itself – all that was in a prophetic vision or a dream. Namely, as the prophet [in his contemplation] had a revelation about some of future events via the riddles and parables of prophecy, his continuing cogitations trigger doubts. He now at times believes the revelation [as true] and at others doubts it to the point that he asks for a sign. The prophetic experience now becomes even stronger within him and [he apprehends] another parable [which makes him feel] as if a sign occurred in front of his eyes. As this theme repeats itself, it strengthens his convictions that the revelation is indeed true and God is indeed ready to make it happen.

I have thus removed from your rational [soul] the veil that envelops it regarding this class [of miracles] revealing its esoteric meaning. You will therefore no longer be surprised by these extreme wonders and the impossible, strange and improbable occurrences according to your rational mind will no longer confuse you. They after all do not retell real happenings but imaginary ones brought about by the imaginative faculty which composes things whether possible, wondrous or impossible. This too is possibly, how we understand the wonders Moshe experienced in the exchange between him and God such as the staff turning into a snake and the clear hand becoming white[3], namely they happened in a prophetic vision. This [vision] was meant to impress on him the obligation to free the Jewish people from Egyptian oppression, possibly by suggesting that Pharaoh who in parables is seen as the crocodile that stands between the rivers will be to Moshe like a staff at the hand of its owner and his [Pharaoh’s] strong arm will become leprous.”

The general idea in this segment is that Rabbi Nissim holds that when the Scriptures report what seems to be an occurrence involving a prophet, if it was something that does not involve others, that occurrence should be interpreted as a vision rather than an actual physical occurrence. It is important to note that the strategy Rabbi Nissim uses is not to force his interpretation as the only possible one but rather to give a variety of interpretations including literal ones, leaving it up to the reader to decide which makes more sense. He does not impose his opinions just presents them and lets the reader make up his mind. Thus, he offers literal explanations too to Moshe’s experience at the beginning of his journey into prophecy. However, his more esoteric explanations are daring and creative, taking a seeming fantasy and turning it into a rational and important teaching.

He then shows how the rabbis in the Midrashim, were addressing the same story in a similar manner. Discussing the difference between a dream or fantasy and a prophetic vision, he points out that dreams always contain irrelevant parts while in a prophetic vision every detail counts.

“Our Rabbis explain, “and it [the staff] became a snake – because he [Moshe] spoke Lashon Hara on Israel, emulating the tradecraft of the snake [as in Adam and Eve].” They also explain regarding the hand turning leprous, white as snow, [that it is a punishment] for saying “behold they will not believe me” and “when someone suspects innocent people he is punished bodily” (Shabbat 97a). We follow the Rabbis approach, namely, being that this was a sign [Ot] to Moshe for his request [for answers] from God, the sign contained these details to make Moshe aware and teach him certain points. It also possibly may indicate to Moshe that if he should throw the staff on the ground it will become a snake, pointing out that , Moshe’s rational mind which when used properly is his staff and support, should he let it become polluted by earthly matters it will turn on him and become a poisonous snake and kill him. On the other hand, should he then lift it from the ground, and use it for lofty purposes thus strengthening his rational faculty, his mind will again be a support and something he can rely upon. ”

Rabbi Nissim understands that the Rabbis, by trying to interpret every detail in the story, are telling us that the story is a prophetic vision and as such, every detail has meaning. This understanding is an expansion of Rambam in his introduction to MN where he also points out that prophecies at times, every detail is important while at others not. In the case of Yaakov and the ladder, it describes a prophetic vision where every detail counts. A chapter in Mishlei which uses a parable of a prostitute to discuss the human mind and its potential, details are unimportant and needed to fill in lacunae in the parable.

As this translated segment refers to a variety of verses and stories spread all over the Scriptures, I have decided not to copy each verse but just to references where the verse Rabbi Nissim refers to can be found. It will be a worthwhile exercise to look at them after reading this piece. It is an eye opener.

[1] Breishit 15:17.

[2] Shoftim 6:11-40.

[3] Shemot 3:1-8.

More About Rabbi Dr. Israel Drazin's Unreasonable "Maimonides: Reason Above All."

2011-03-07T15:46:00.002-05:00

Eliezer Abrahamson posted this short review of the over promoted book by Israel Drazin on here and on Amazon. I have written about this book earlier here .

Maimonides was one of the greatest rabbinic figures in history. He made a profound and permanent impact upon the Jewish world, and his influence spread well beyond the borders of the Jewish community. He was universally recognized as a great scholar of the Bible and Talmud, and his works have become basic texts of the Jewish canon. At the same time, Maimonides was an original thinker who put forth a number of opinions that were controversial in his own time and some of these controversies resonate until today. The bulk of the controversy surrounds his efforts, mainly in his great philosophical work,�Guide for the Perplexed, to resolve conflicts between traditional Jewish teachings and Aristotelian philosophy.

Because of the importance of Maimonides and the debates surrounding some of his opinions, a good introductory work to the thought of Maimonides and his contemporaries, clearly explaining where and how he differed from other major figures, would be highly desirable. Unfortunately, that is not what the reader will encounter when reading Israel Drazin's new book,�Maimonides: Reason Above All.

Despite the book's promising description and the author's apparent qualifications, the book not only fails to live up to expectations, but it even fails to attain the most minimal standards of academic competence and intellectual honesty. The book is replete, page after page, with misstatements, distortions, and dishonest citations and quotations. After a great deal of effort, I was forced to conclude that I could not find a single redeeming characteristic in the book.

Drazin fails to understand the opinions of any the scholars he is discussing, whether it is Maimonides himself, other Jewish scholars, or even non-Jewish philosophers. He appears to have difficulty with even basic reading comprehension. For example, on page 26, Drazin begins a detailed analysis of a statement from "the poet Yehuda Halevi" in which Halevi negatively contrasted Maimonides with his father. This is an amazing statement, in that Yehuda Halevi, one of the greatest Jewish philosophers and poets, died in 1141, when Maimonides was about two years old. (This should be immediately obvious to anyone with even a passing familiarity with Jewish intellectual history.) The quote that Drazin is discussing - which he got from a secondary source (which does�notascribe the quote to Yehuda Halevi) - was actually written by L. M. Simmons, an English rabbi, in the Jewish Quarterly Review in 1890. Drazin's failure in this simple citation is unfortunately typical of his entire work. Over and over again, Drazin makes basic errors of fact and comprehension.

The quality of this work is so poor that it does not really deserve a detailed response. There is, quite literally, not a single issue that Drazin presents accurately. When attempting to present a dispute, Drazin usually gets both sides wrong, and misses the actual point of disagreement entirely. In other cases, Drazin creates disputes where none exist. Drazin's presentation of Maimonides is so heavily biased, that it quickly reaches the point of absurdity.�

Drazin effectively attempts to reconstruct Maimonides as a religious naturalist who rejected creation ex nihilo, miracles, providence, prophecy, the existence of the soul, the resurrection of the dead, and any God-oriented purpose in religion. Drazin openly admits that it is only possible to do so by denying many - many!! - of Maimonides' own statements. Drazin believes that Maimonides' was simply lying when he said these things. This is a major theme of Drazin's work, that Maimonides engaged in a "holy lie" (a phrase coined by Nietzsche that Drazin uses repeatedly) and knowingly made completely false statements to deceive the masses (for their own good, of course). Drazin makes this claim not just of some of the more difficult passages in Maimonides'�Guide for the Perplexed�(even this is debatable), but of vast swathes of his writings, including large amounts of material that was unique to Maimonides. For example, Maimonides was the first Jewish scholar to create a formalized dogma of Judaism, his 13 Foundations, which Maimonides argued must be fully accepted in order for one to be a legitimate member of the Jewish faith. This idea was original to Maimonides, and, indeed, many authorities disagreed with his formulation (although, by and large, they agreed with its content). Drazin, however, would have us believe that Maimonides himself did not believe many, possibly most, of these foundations.

Even when Drazin directly quotes Maimonides (and others), he does so dishonestly, carefully editing the quote (using ellipses to remove inconvenient material and inserting material in brackets) to support his point even when the full quote, in context, would not only fail to support Drazin's point, but actually contradict it. This betrayal of the reader's trust is exacerbated by the fact that many of Drayzin's most radical assertions are supported by nothing more than anonymous "scholars" without any reference to who these scholars are, what they actually said, or where and when they said it. Given Drayzin's repeated inability to comprehend the material he is writing about, and his dishonest citations of material that people can actually check for themselves, it is simply impossible to trust his assertion of the opinions of scholars whom he fails to even identify.

If Drazin's presentation of Maimonides is absurd, his presentation of other Jewish thinkers is grotesque. For example, Drazin apparently understands all anthropomorphic depictions of God, midrashic, kabalistic or liturgical, to have been intended in the full literal sense. Thus, his presentation of Lurianic kabbalah on page 241 is beyond laughable; it is a caricature of a caricature.

Even Drazin's discussion of non-Jewish philosophers is incompetent. For some reason, Drazin chose to include an entire chapter on Rene Descartes, apparently to argue that Descartes was not sufficiently "rational". In the course of this discussion, Drazin completely mangles Descartes, and demonstrates a complete failure to grasp even the most basic elements of his thought. Drazin's "refutation" of Descartes' "cogito" - again given in the name of anonymous scholars - is so shallow that it wouldn't past muster in a seventh grade classroom discussion.

If Drazin's work were of a better quality, it would be worthwhile to enter into a deeper discussion of some of the arguments he puts forth. For example, the relationship between the thought of Maimonides and the thought of his son, Abraham, is one that requires serious study. However, Drazin's presentation of the thought of both figures is so distorted that he contributes nothing to the discussion except confusion.

In short, Drazin's book is so... awful... that readers will not only learn nothing new, but, far worse, they will learn a large number of things that are not so. If a reader wishes to educate himself about the thought of Maimonides, there are many vastly superior works. My personal recommendation as a basic introduction would be�A Maimonides Reader�by Isadore Twersky.

Without In Any Way Moving a Body: A Change in Perspective - The Welfare of The Body and The Soul.

2011-02-21T10:29:00.000-05:00

Rambam at the end of MN 1:24 makes a fascinating statement that opens a very intriguing view of Imitato Dei. The chapter discusses the word Halicha – going as it refers to God. The word at times is used in the context of leaving or going away.

“And just as the withdrawal of providence is referred to as the hiding of the face – as in the dictum: And as for Me, I will surely hide my face – it also is referred to as going, which has the meaning to turn away from a thing. Thus Scripture says: I will go and return to my place.”

As discussed in my previous post on MN 1:23, when we say that God is leaving, we are saying that a person has lost his connection with God, thereby subjecting himself to the random flow and ebb of events. He no longer acts in conformity with providence – Hashgacha.

At other times the word Halicha is used in the context of the spread of a thing. It is similar to the word Yetziah discussed in the earlier chapter, where it means that God’s decree is spreading out.

“As for its dictum, and the anger of the Lord was kindled against them, and he went away, the two significations subsist together in the same passage. I mean the signification of a withdrawal of providence referred to by means of the term “turning away”, and the signification of a spread, diffusion, and manifestation of a thing. I mean to say it was the anger that went and extended toward the two. For this reason Miriam became leprous as white as snow.”

Rambam is talking about the story in Bamidbar 12.

ט וַיִּחַר-אַף יְהוָה בָּם, וַיֵּלַךְ.	9 And the anger of the LORD was kindled against them; and He departed.
י וְהֶעָנָן, סָר מֵעַל הָאֹהֶל, וְהִנֵּה מִרְיָם, מְצֹרַעַת כַּשָּׁלֶג; וַיִּפֶן אַהֲרֹן אֶל-מִרְיָם, וְהִנֵּה מְצֹרָעַת.	10 And when the cloud was removed from over the Tent, behold, Miriam was leprous, as white as snow; and Aaron looked upon Miriam; and, behold, she was leprous.
יא וַיֹּאמֶר אַהֲרֹן, אֶל-מֹשֶׁה: בִּי אֲדֹנִי--אַל-נָא תָשֵׁת עָלֵינוּ חַטָּאת, אֲשֶׁר נוֹאַלְנוּ וַאֲשֶׁר חָטָאנוּ.	11 And Aaron said unto Moses: 'Oh my lord, lay not, I pray thee, sin upon us, for that we have done foolishly, and for that we have sinned.
יב אַל-נָא תְהִי, כַּמֵּת, אֲשֶׁר בְּצֵאתוֹ מֵרֶחֶם אִמּוֹ, וַיֵּאָכֵל חֲצִי בְשָׂרוֹ.	12 Let her not, I pray, be as one dead, of whom the flesh is half consumed when he cometh out of his mother's womb.'

Miriam’s error of comparing Moshe with other prophets, her not discerning the difference between his type of prophecy and the kind of prophecy other prophets experienced, disconnected her from providence. It was such a fundamental misunderstanding of how humans interact with God that she was no longer acting in accordance with providence – Hashgacha. She was therefore left to the vagaries of nature and no longer in control of her destiny, a kind of death represented by the leprosy that appeared on her hand. That change in status is the spread of the decree of God, His will at creation of what a “living” human being is, one who fully employs his free will by taking control of his destiny.[1]

Having established that the term Halicha – whether in its connotation of God “going away” or the “spreading out of God’s decree” – does not have any physical implication, Rambam, in a surprising aside, turns to a human mitzvah and applies the same idea.

“The term going is also applied figuratively to living a good life[2], without in any way moving a body. Thus it says: And you shall go in His ways(Devarim 28:9); After the Lord your God you should go(Devarim 13:5); Come and let us walk in the light of God (Yeshayahu 2:5).”

We are talking about the eighth positive commandment.

המצווה השמינית

הציווי שנצטווינו להדמות לו ית' כפי יכלתנו,

והוא אמרו:
"והלכת בדרכיו" (דברים כח, ט). וכבר כפל ציווי זה ואמר: "ללכת בכל-דרכיו" (שם יא, כב), ובא בפירוש עניין זה:

"מה הקב"ה נקרא רחום - אף אתה היה רחום;
הקב"ה נקרא חנון - אף אתה היה חנון;
הקב"ה נקרא צדיק - אף אתה היה צדיק;
הקב"ה נקרא חסיד - אף אתה היה חסיד" - זהו לשון ספרי.

וכבר כפל צווי זה בלשון אחר ואמר: "אחרי ה' אלקיכם תלכו" (שם יג, ה), וגם בפירושו בא, שעניינו להתדמות למעשים הטובים ולמידות הנכבדות שבהם מתואר יתעלה על דרך המשל - יתעלה על הכל עילוי רב

How does one implement practically the Mitzvah of Imitato Dei by being merciful, righteous “Without in any way moving a body”?

The issue becomes even more baffling when we realize that these actions are reciprocal and fall under the rubric of social Mitzvot. Society cannot function without certain ethical rules that are reciprocal in the sense that by treating well your neighbor, he will do the same to you keeping the peace and maintaining a healthy society. This should therefore not be seen as a theological Mitzvah, Bein Adam Lamakom, but rather a humanistic one, Bein Adam Lacheveiro. Indeed Rambam in MN 3:27 makes the point that there are two categories of Mitzvot- those that are aimed at “the welfare of the soul” and those that are meant to deal with the “welfare of the body”.

“As for the welfare of the body, it comes about by their improvement of the ways of living one with another.… Know that between these two aims, one is indubitably greater in nobility, namely the welfare of the soul – I mean the procuring of correct opinions – with the second aim – I mean the welfare of the body – is prior in nature and time. The latter aim consists in the governance of the city and the well-being of the states of all its people according to their capacity.”

It is clear that the Mitzvot that deal with our relationship with the other, are only intermediate goals that help us achieve the ultimate goal of correct theology –“the welfare of the soul”. However, at the end of the Moreh, in chapter 3:54, where Rambam ends his philosophical Magnum Opus with the exhilarating description of the purpose of man in this world, he presents these same Mitzvot as the end goal, seemingly even higher than “the procuring of correct opinions”.

“…For when explaining in this verse the noblest ends, he does not limit them only to the apprehension of Him, may He be exalted…. But he says that one should glory in the apprehension of Myself and in the knowledge of My attributes, by which he means His actions. … He means that it is My purpose that there should come from you loving-kindness, righteousness, and judgment in the earth in the way we have explained with regard to the thirteen attributes: namely, that the purpose should be assimilation to them and that this should be our way of life.”

In this presentation, emulating God by acting with kindness and righteousness is the ultimate goal and not just an intermediate stage that paves the way for intellectual excellence – the ultimate goal. How are we to understand these seemingly contradictory presentations?

I believe that this seeming contradiction is an important key to Rambam’s thought. Generally, it is accepted that Rambam sees intellectual excellence as the goal of humankind. Perfected man is the intellectual one who contemplates his existence and its relationship with God and his creation. Nothing can be farther from the truth. Rambam’s theology is very much action oriented.

At first blush, it would seem that the social aspects of interpersonal interaction are of paramount importance. However, if looked at carefully, it is more tactic than strategy. When I give alms to a poor man, I acknowledge that fate may put me at some future time into the same predicament and I hope that fellow man will reciprocate. By making Tzedakah – the giving of alms – a Mitzvah, a required social behavior, this improves the odds that this will be the case. The same applies to all the other Mitzvot categorized as bein Adam lacheveiro. These laws are expedient and make for a healthy society but there is no long-term plan other than the perpetuation of this society or social system. It is in a way narcissistic. Indeed, such an organized, healthy and lawful society has a better chance for it to have individuals who attain great intellectual excellence and perfection, but again that is very narrowly focused on the self, whether the individual or the community. However, an understanding of our personal existence and its relationship to the rest of the universe, a universe created by God with wisdom and purpose, makes us act with a vision that encompasses the whole of our existence. That same Mitzvah of Tzedakah is no longer done with an expectation of reciprocity, but because it is integral part of how God runs His world. By doing the mitzvah, we are fulfilling God’s will and the role he wants us to play in His universe and are responsible for the consequences these actions may bring. By emulating Him, we are partaking in His creation.

Is there a practical aspect to this difference in perspective? It is impossible for us to personally point to the difference without it being experiential and looking at the long-term consequences which may be more than one lifetime. In other words, we would have to reach the pinnacle of perfection and act accordingly, to understand the practical implications of this changed perspective. However, the Torah illustrates it very vividly in the story of the Egel, the golden calf, and Moshe’s reaction to it. When Moshe was confronted with the people straying to the Egel after their experience at Sinai he was at a total loss. How was he to proceed and forestall future repeats of the incident? If the Sinai experience was not enough to wean the people from idolatry, what would?

יב וַיֹּאמֶר מֹשֶׁה אֶל-יְהוָה, רְאֵה אַתָּה אֹמֵר אֵלַי הַעַל אֶת-הָעָם הַזֶּה, וְאַתָּה לֹא הוֹדַעְתַּנִי, אֵת אֲשֶׁר-תִּשְׁלַח עִמִּי; וְאַתָּה אָמַרְתָּ יְדַעְתִּיךָ בְשֵׁם, וְגַם-מָצָאתָ חֵן בְּעֵינָי.	12 And Moses said unto the LORD: 'See, You say unto me: Bring up this people; and Thou hast not let me know whom Thou wilt send with me. Yet Thou hast said: I know thee by name, and thou hast also found grace in My sight.
יג וְעַתָּה אִם-נָא מָצָאתִי חֵן בְּעֵינֶיךָ, הוֹדִעֵנִי נָא אֶת-דְּרָכֶךָ, וְאֵדָעֲךָ, לְמַעַן אֶמְצָא-חֵן בְּעֵינֶיךָ; וּרְאֵה, כִּי עַמְּךָ הַגּוֹי הַזֶּה.	13 Now therefore, I pray Thee, if I have found grace in Thy sight, show me now Thy ways, that I may know Thee, to the end that I may find grace in Thy sight; and consider that this nation is Thy people.'

Rambam in MN 1:54 explains this request as follows;

“The second request which he [Moshe] put first is that He should let him know His attributes. … This was Moshe’s ultimate object in his demand, the conclusion of what he says being: that I may know thee, to the end that I may find grace in thy sight and consider that this nation is thy people. That is, a people for the government of which I need to perform actions that I must seek similar to thy actions in governing them”.

The attributes that Moshe focuses on are mercy, righteousness and other similar ones that are seemingly interpersonal social behavior. Indeed, they are but the perspective that Moshe takes in their performance is a universal one, one focused on the whole universe and the role and place he and the people have in it, emulating God’s ways in governing His world. The results of Moshe’s actions and teachings are still very much meaningful today three thousand years later. That is the real understanding of the eighth positive commandment - והלכת בדרכיו . The outward act does not change; it is mercy and righteousness but with a different perspective, without in any way moving a body.

[1] For a further discussion, see my article here . Also, see Rambam at the end of Hilchot Tume’at Tzara’at 16:10 where he begins the presentation as Lashon Hara and subtly transits to theological error. That Halacha warrants further treatment as time will allow.

[2] Pines notes in a footnote that literally the translation should be “to going (or walking) a good or virtuous life”.

Providence and Chance - Calamity and Calamity.

2011-02-06T16:22:00.002-05:00

Learning MN1:23, we get an interesting insight into Rambam’s understanding of Providence. For a thorough treatment of Divine Providence, see my article in Hakirah here

The chapter deals with the word Yetziah – going out as it is used in Tanach with reference to God. As God is not a body, is immaterial, how can there be movement from one place to another? Rambam explains that

“The term is applied figuratively to the manifestation of things that are in no way a body… meaning the propagation of the matter… Every mention of going out occurring in Scriptures with reference to Him conforms to this figurative use. ”

Rambam uses a verse in Yeshayahu 26:21 as the central example of this usage. To understand Rambam we have to read this verse in context. Starting at chapter 24, we have a collection of prophecies about the destruction of the land and the subsequent glorious reconstruction and return of its righteous inhabitants. The prophet foretells the calamities that are coming and offers a mixture of hope and advice on how to survive the coming storm. Our verse, the second in a two-verse prophecy, reads:

כ לֵךְ עַמִּי בֹּא בַחֲדָרֶיךָ, וּסְגֹר דלתיך (דְּלָתְךָ) בַּעֲדֶךָ; חֲבִי כִמְעַט-רֶגַע, עַד-יעבור- (יַעֲבָר-) זָעַם.	20 Come, my people, enter into your chambers, and shut your doors about you; hide yourself for a little moment, until the indignation passes.
כא כִּי-הִנֵּה יְהוָה יֹצֵא מִמְּקוֹמוֹ, לִפְקֹד עֲו‍ֹן יֹשֵׁב-הָאָרֶץ עָלָיו; וְגִלְּתָה הָאָרֶץ אֶת-דָּמֶיהָ, וְלֹא-תְכַסֶּה עוֹד עַל-הֲרוּגֶיהָ. {פ}	21 For, behold, the LORD goes out of His place to visit upon the inhabitants of the earth their iniquity; the earth also shall disclose her blood, and shall no more cover her slain. {P}

Rambam comments:

“Thus: For, behold, the LORD goes out of His place, that is His decree, which at present is hidden from us, will become manifest.”

God does not go out. There is a missing subtext in the verse, the word “decree”. God’s decree is going to take effect thus “go out”.

“I refer to the coming into being of something after its not having existed, for everything that comes into being from God is attributed to His decree.”

Lest you think that God decrees in real time, in other words reacts to circumstances and acts when He deems it necessary, Rambam explains that the decree refers to God’s will at creation[1]. In other words, there is a natural system of cause and effect that conforms to God’s original will.

“Thus: By the word of the Lord were the heavens made and all the host of them by the breath of His mouth (Tehilim 33:6).In this verse God’s acts are likened to those that proceed from kings, whose instrument in giving effect to their will is speech. However, God does not require an instrument by the means of which He could act for His acts are accomplished by means of His will alone; neither is there any speech at all as shall be made clear.”

God does not speak nor does He decree or do any such things; God wills, where will is one with His essence and things come into being. That is how the heavens came into being and all they contain. Similarly, Rambam reads the verses in Yeshayahu as telling us that as a consequence of the misdeeds of the people a calamity is about to befall them. That calamity is foreseeable and is indeed foreseen by Yeshayahu’s prophecy which he acquired by contemplating the iniquities of his contemporaries and their naturally resulting consequences. Those who understand this on their own or accept his warning can therefore protect themselves by hiding out and lying low “until the indignation passes”. It is important to realize that this perspective of seeing events in a cause and effect system is only a perception on our part. One has to look at events and interpret them by seeing the larger picture of how they came into being to arrive at that conclusion. It is not necessarily self-evident[2].

“Inasmuch as the term going out as we have made clear, was figuratively applied to the manifestation of an act of God – for scriptures says: For, behold, the LORD goes out of His place – the term returning (Shiva) is figuratively applied to the cessation of such an act likewise brought about in virtue of God’s will.”

Rambam now addresses a related term often used in connection with God – returning. When someone leaves a place at times he returns – so too the metaphor when we talk about God. If going out is the manifestation of an act of God, returning is the cessation of such an act. The verse that exemplifies this is from Hoshea 5:15 –

טו אֵלֵךְ אָשׁוּבָה אֶל-מְקוֹמִי, עַד אֲשֶׁר-יֶאְשְׁמוּ וּבִקְשׁוּ פָנָי: בַּצַּר לָהֶם, יְשַׁחֲרֻנְנִי.

15 I will go and return to My place, till they acknowledge their guilt, and seek My face; in their trouble they will seek Me earnestly:

The prophet castigates

Israel

(the Ten Tribes) and foretells their destruction. In the case of the Ten Tribes, however, there are no survivors or any who protect themselves from the onrushing disaster. The prophet’s warning is not heeded.

“…the signification of which is that the indwelling that had been among us has been removed. This removal is followed by a privation of providence as far as we are concerned.”

It is remarkable that both the former verse and this verse talk about calamities but the one in Yeshayahu is seen as providence – Hashgacha – while the one in Hoshea is seen as the removal of providence.

“For a privation of providence leaves one abandoned and a target to all that may happen and come about, so that his ill and weal come about according to chance. How terrible is this threat!”

When the prophet is ignored, the people are caught off-guard and chance rules there is no possibility of taking control and trying to save a remnant. The destruction becomes total. It is only when they acknowledge their guilt, and seek My face that providence returns and redemption may ensue. The punishment of abandonment, of being left to chance even with its possibility of good, is worse than knowing about the coming bad times. Knowledge gives one a chance to protect oneself. The calamity that befalls us unbeknownst drowns out the good times completely.

Reading this brings to mind pre-Holocaust Orthodox European Jewry where the majority ignored the signs of doom on the horizon. Instead of pushing for immigration to Palestine and

America

, mainstream Orthodox Jewish leadership insisted on staying put. It was only the few, the minority that heeded Rav Kook and his follower’s call in the Twenties and Thirties to come to Eretz

Israel

. It was only the few prescient and those pushed by the pogroms and anti-Semitism that had the foresight to come to

America

. The European Jewish leadership sadly did not put any effort into building up Torah in America or

Israel

[3] and prepare a place of refuge. However, clearly, it was not a total privation of providence. The few were enough to have a remnant rebuild and grow again. History repeats itself.

It is interesting to note that Narboni, one of the classical commentators of the Moreh, though cryptic, apparently reads this piece the way I explained it here. Abravanel strongly disagrees but his reading is extremely forced.

[1] The basis for this reading is the choice of the verse to explain speech. There are endless verses that attribute speech in this context to God but Rambam chose the one about creation – the coming into existence of the heavens.

[2] See MN1:8 for the meaning of “place” as it refers to God. God leaving His place is thus an interpretation of perceived occurrences and our perception of God as changing “place”. We see Him as an active rather than a passive Deity while in truth He is neither.

[3] With the exception of Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzinsky who sent Rav Karelitz, the Chazon Ish to

Israel

. Better late than never.

Are Mitzvot Always Beneficial? Can A Mitzvah Harm Someone?

2011-02-02T06:53:00.001-05:00

Are Mitzvot always beneficial? Are they always healthy? Let me take the question a step further; is it possible that a Mitzvah may harm us physically or psychologically?

Rambam tells us in MN 3:34 –

“It is also important to note that the Law does not pay attention to the isolated. It is not based on conditions which rarely occur. Whatever the Law teaches, whether it is of an intellectual, a moral, or a practical character, is founded on that which is the rule and not on that which is the exception: it ignores the injury that might be caused to a single person through a certain maxim or a certain divine precept.”

He makes even more explicit as he goes on in the chapter

“We must consequently not be surprised when we find that the object of the Law does not fully appear in every individual; there must naturally be people who are not perfected by the instruction of the Law, just as there are beings which do not receive from the specific forms in Nature all that they require.”

Clearly, a Mitzvah may not work for everybody. Some people will even be harmed and find a Mitzvah counterproductive or harmful. I know that this sounds very disturbing to many people especially those brought up in the Frum community, but the facts are otherwise. Indeed, one may NOT say that a Mitzvah protects and therefore I will keep it even when it puts my life at risk. Unless we are dealing with one of three critical Mitzvot, Avodah Zara (Idolatry), murder or certain sexual transgressions, or in matters that involve Chilul Hashem, life takes precedence. One who chooses to give the Mitzvah precedence in such cases is wrong.

ג ואסור להתמהמה בחילול שבת, לחולה שיש בו סכנה, שנאמר "אשר יעשה אותם האדם וחי בהם" (ויקרא יח,ה), ולא שימות בהם. הא למדת, שאין משפטי התורה נקמה בעולם, אלא רחמים וחסד ושלום בעולם. ואלו המינים שאומרים שזה חילול ואסור, עליהן הכתוב אומר "וגם אני נתתי להם, חוקים לא טובים; ומשפטים--לא יחיו, בהם"

MT Hil Shabbat 2:3

If Mitzvot were always protective, why demand they be ignored when life is at risk? Would they not protect? Rambam in fact condemns those who believe Mitzvot take precedence over life and refers to them as Minim.

The ultimate goal of Mitzvot is to make us into better people. They are meant to control unbridled desires and to set social rules so that we live in an orderly and just society. The ultimate goal, however, is to allow us to have quality time to get to know the world we live in and try to decipher the purpose of our existence, the will of God who put us here. Our physical and psychic well-being is necessary if we are to accomplish that but is not a goal in itself. Some positive or negative commandments may be counterproductive to certain individuals. Unless it is life threatening, that individual is required to abide by the law no matter how painful or uncomfortable it is. That subservience to the law in itself is spiritually beneficial and strengthens character although it may hurt in other areas. That is the deep meaning of the Mishna (Avot 4:2) ששכר מצוה מצוה – the reward of a Mitzvah is the deed itself.

Strawberries and Dates

2011-01-23T07:12:00.000-05:00

Strawberries and Dates I guess not everybody is into Chumrot.

Hat Tip

How Could The Great Moshe Have a Grandson Like Micha? What Are The Rabbis Teaching?

2011-01-23T07:00:00.000-05:00

See this post at this infrequent Blogger on last week Parsha.

Modesty (Tzniut) as Theology -

2011-01-02T06:48:00.001-05:00

In a conversation with my brother regarding the custom for men to cover their heads, he pointed out that Rambam considers it a matter of Tzniut – modesty. Indeed, Rambam in Hilchot De’ot 5:10 writes –

צניעות גדולה נוהגים תלמידי חכמים בעצמן: לא יתבזו, ולא יגלו ראשן ולא גופן.

At first blush, it seems a little odd. What immodesty is there in uncovering one’s head? I can accept that being naked in public is immodest but in private? Rambam does not differentiate. As usual, to understand Rambam he has to be read in the broad context of his overall thoughts. Hebrewbooks.org in their excellent Rambam tag where they have added some key commentators on each Halacha, points to an obscure sefer Midot Vede’ot by R. Shmarya Leib Horowitz (1878-1938), probably chosen by Hebrewbooks.org because he lived and served as a Rav in New York, who links this Halacha with MN 3:52.

“We do not sit, move, and occupy ourselves when we are alone and at home, in the same manner as we do in the presence of a great king. We speak and open our mouth as we please when we are with the people of our own household and with our relatives, but not so when we are in a royal assembly. If we therefore desire to attain human perfection, and to be truly men of God, we must awake from our sleep, and bear in mind that the great king that is over us, and is always joined to us, is greater than any earthly king, greater than David and Shlomo are. The king that cleaves to us and embraces us is the Intellect that influences us, and forms the link between us and God. We perceive God by means of that light that He sends down unto us, wherefore the Psalmist says, "In Thy light shall we see light" (Ps. xxxvi. 10): so God looks down upon us through that same light, and is always with us beholding and watching us on account of this light." Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him?" (Jer. xxiii. 24). Note this particularly[1].

When the perfect bear this in mind, they will be filled with fear of God, humility, and piety, with true, not apparent, reverence and respect of God, in such a manner that their conduct, even when alone with their wives or in the bath, will be as modest as they are in public intercourse with other people. Thus, it is related of our renowned Sages that even in their sexual intercourse with their wives they behaved with great modesty. They also said, "Who is modest? He whose conduct in the dark night is the same as in the day." You know also, how much they warned us not to walk proudly, since "the fullness of the whole earth is His glory" (Isa. vi. 3). They thought that by these rules the above-mentioned idea will be firmly established in the hearts of men, viz., that we are always before God, and it is in the presence of His glory that we go to and fro. The great men among our Sages would not uncover their heads because they believed that God's glory was round them and over them.”

The idea of Tzniut thus takes on a completely different form. Indeed, it starts off as a social issue, where nakedness is seen as anti-social. The taboo of nakedness does not come to us naturally but results from our obsession with immediate satisfaction of our physical urges. It is a social custom imposed on society to protect its individuals from each other. Rambam points out in MN 1:2 that a man in a perfected utopian state, one who is totally immersed in intellectual and existential matters, such a person does not see nakedness as untoward:

“When Adam was yet in a state of innocence, and was guided solely by reflection and reason--on account of which it is said: "Thou hast made him (man) little lower than the angels" (Ps. viii. 6)--he was not at all able to follow or to understand the principles of apparent truths. The most manifest impropriety, e.g. to appear in a state of nudity, was nothing unbecoming according to his idea: he could not comprehend why it should be so.”

It is only imperfect man with his misplaced priorities that perceives nakedness as wrong.

“After man's disobedience, however, when he began to give way to desires which had their source in his imagination and to the gratification of his bodily appetites, as it is said, "And the wife saw that the tree was good for food and delightful to the eyes" (Gen. iii. 6), he was punished by the loss of part of that intellectual faculty which he had previously possessed. … Further observe the passage, "And the eyes of both were opened, and they knew they were naked" (Gen. iii. 7). It is not said, "And the eyes of both were opened, and they saw"; for what the man had seen previously and what he saw after this circumstance was precisely the same: there had been no blindness which was now removed, but he received a new faculty whereby he found things wrong which previously he had not regarded as wrong.”

The taboo resulting from this social norm[2] is the basis for transforming this unsocial behavior into a source of shame and a display of disrespect. That perception of shame and disrespect becomes ingrained into the human psyche and is then used in a positive sense, extending the taboo even to private settings even when a person is alone, even to uncovering parts of the body such as the head that do not interfere with day-to-day activities. This creates a perception of the permanent presence of God. It is taking a human weakness and using it as positive reinforcement by bringing him closer to his utopian potential. It really is no different from most Mitzvot where human traits and weaknesses are used as positive tools for shaping our behavior and eventually our thoughts.

[1] Note how Rambam points to the intellect that links us with God and not God Himself highlighting that point. To be discussed at some future date.

[2] The Halachot dealing with Tzniut as social norm and also as interpersonal behavior between husband and wife as well as other family members and friends are legislated in Hilchot Issurei Biah chapter 21.

The Conundrum of Korbanot - Part 1 - Introduction.

2010-12-20T06:11:00.000-05:00

Rambam’s explanation of the reason for the Mitzvot related to Korbanot has been discussed for generations from the famous Ramban at the beginning of Vaykra followed by almost every Maimonidean scholar and commenter, classic or modern, since. To complicate the matter even more is the apparent inconsistency in Rambam’s own position between the different places in his writing where he addresses the issue. (He addresses the issue in every one of his books, whether directly or implicitly. I will try to address all of them as we go along.)

For the contemporary Jew, Korbanot is a major problem. It is contrary to our whole understanding of right and wrong to sacrifice living things just to ask forgiveness or placate God. The idea itself of placating God, though still acceptable in many circle, goes against the sensibilities of a more sophisticated understanding of a transcendent God. In truth, even the prophets, found the idea of Korbanot to be incongruous. We read in the Haftorah before Tisha Be’av, where Yeshayahu 1:11 declares –

יא לָמָּה-לִּי רֹב-זִבְחֵיכֶם יֹאמַר יְהוָה, שָׂבַעְתִּי עֹלוֹת אֵילִים וְחֵלֶב מְרִיאִים; וְדַם פָּרִים וּכְבָשִׂים וְעַתּוּדִים, לֹא חָפָצְתִּי.

11 To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto Me? says the LORD; I am full of the burnt-offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts; and I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he-goats.

And Yirmyahu (11:22) declares in an astounding denial –

כב כִּי לֹא-דִבַּרְתִּי אֶת-אֲבוֹתֵיכֶם, וְלֹא צִוִּיתִים, בְּיוֹם הוציא (הוֹצִיאִי) אוֹתָם, מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם--עַל-דִּבְרֵי עוֹלָה, וָזָבַח.

22 For I spoke not unto your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt-offerings or sacrifices;

So how are we to understand the centrality of Korbanot in Jewish Halacha? Besides the extensive detailed precepts we find in the written Torah, in fact, it is the most regulated ritual of all, in addition we have a whole section in the Gemara – Seder Kodashim – discussing just those rules in addition to there being discussions scattered all over Shas. Rambam in his MT dedicates two of the 14 Books to Korbanot – Sefer Avodah and Sefer Korbanot. Our daily prayer is modeled after Korbanot and we pray constantly for their return once the Beit Hamikdash is rebuilt. How is a contemporary thoughtful Jew supposed to deal with this whole corpus of ritual?

I believe a discussion based on Rambam’s many writings on the subject can bring us closer to a resolution and a better understanding of how to deal with this dilemma. As a continuation of my earlier posts on Ta’amei Hamitzvot, I will dedicate a few posts to this subject.

As I have discussed many times, Rambam does not accept the idea that Mitzvot have any intrinsic worth. In other words, a Mitzvah does not influence God nor does it change His supposed opinion of us. All Mitzvot are meant for us, either to teach us a proper theology, or to help us change our behavior and improve ourselves or to establish and maintain a properly functioning society. It is in this vein that Rambam begins his discussion of Korbanot in MN 3:32. Interestingly it is here that he elaborates on the idea that Mitzvot are fine-tuned psychologically to help us change our way of thinking. He starts by giving a lesson in the natural evolution and adaptation to the environment of all living things.

“If you consider the divine actions – I mean to say the natural actions – the deity’s wily graciousness and wisdom, as shown in the creation of living beings, in the gradation of the motions of the limbs, and the proximity of some of the latter to others, will through them become clear to you.”

He then continues to detail how every limb and part of living things are so perfectly calibrated to function with each other, be protected from a hostile environment and generally the intelligent way all biological things are made. He then continues –

“Many things in our Law are due to something similar to this very governance on the part of Him who governs…”

The Mitzvot according to Rambam are tailored to the physical world we live in. They are tailored to work with our human biology and psyche. Unlike many thinkers who saw the Mitzvot as a way of influencing higher powers, changing the way “shefa” – the flow - comes to us; Rambam sees them as intended to influence our behavior and thought process.

“For a sudden transition from one opposite to another is impossible. And therefore, man, according to his nature, is not capable of abandoning suddenly all to which he was accustomed. As therefore God sent Moshe our master to make out of us a kingdom of priests and a holy nation- through the knowledge of Him…..”

Human beings cannot change their behavior or their thinking in one leap. They require a gradual process of education and learning, training oneself to react differently and to think rationally. Mitzvot are intended to help us accomplish that and bring about a change in our behavior and thinking. They accomplish that gradually. The goal of Mitzvot is to transform the primitive human being into a sophisticated thinker, one who is consumed with daily physical survival into an intellectual devoted to understanding existential matters. That goal is multi-generational and evolves over millennia. For it to work, the Torah had to be tailored so that it puts a person on a path to development, starting with the state he is in currently and advancing with him as he grows intellectually. All Mitzvot are therefore only tools necessary for us to reach our goal of intellectual development.

“… and that similarly all the actions prescribed by the Law – I refer to the various species of worship and also the moral habits that are useful to all people in their mutual dealings – that all this is not to be compared with the ultimate end and does not equal it, being but preparations made for the sake of this end.” (MN3:54)

As we will see in upcoming posts, Korbanot are a paradigm for all Mitzvot, demonstrating very succinctly this idea of Mitzvot. That is why the Rambam in his Pirush on the second Mishna in Avot –

הוא היה אומר, על שלושה דברים העולם עומד--על התורה, ועל העבודה, ועל גמילות החסדים.

ב] יאמר, שבחכמה, והיא התורה, ובמעלות המידות, והן גמילות חסדים, ובקיום ציוויי התורה, והן הקרבנות - התמדת תיקון העולם, וסידור מציאותו על האופן השלם ביותר.

The word Avodah refers to Mitzvot and the paradigm for them is Korbanot. The Mishna is telling us that the physical world owes its continuity and existence – de facto and not in a mystical way – on three things:

Torah – which includes ALL knowledge including the sciences namely Chochma.

Gemilut Chassadim – which represent all the social laws, being they are reciprocal.

Avodah – refers to all the ritualistic laws that are represented by Korbanot.

They all have as purpose to bring us to search for the existential meaning of our existence and the goal and responsibilities we have as part of HKBH’s world. It is only then that we can act responsibly and insure continuity -- התמדת תיקון העולם, וסידור מציאותו על האופן השלם ביותר .

To be continued.

Uncertainty and Knowing God and His Ways.

2010-12-01T15:44:00.001-05:00

Responding further to Evanston Jew’s (EJ) questions in a comment thread earlier this month:

You say the Torah is the mind of God. How does God have a mind? He doesn’t have a body. Is God more than the mind of God?

Since God has no body, He therefore cannot have a mind as EJ points out. The only way we human can try, and I emphasize, “Try” to decipher God’s overall blueprint for our existence, is by contemplating our environment and ourselves and try to make sense of it. From our perspective, we say that we are searching for God’s mind. We know rationally that God does not “think”, want, wish, have thoughts, emote or do any of the things we humans do, as that would indicate change, qualities that cannot exist in a unique transcendental entity. We however cannot imagine that the results we observe could come about from any entity that does not “think” the way we do; we therefore refer to it as the “mind” of God or Chochmato in philosophical discourse.
This brings us to the next question:

How does love of God equal knowledge of science and/or God? What is knowledge of God?

Love is a feeling that results from intimacy. We love a loved one because we know that person intimately. That differentiates love from lust between man and woman. We cannot try to know God, who does not exist in the sense we know existence, except by observing the results of His actions. Recognizing that there is a First Cause, a non-contingent entity, there is only one way to get some inkling about that entity, by understanding to the extent we can, the results of His actions by observing these results. Understanding our environment and ourselves, the results of His actions [please remember “action” is a human term for how these kinds of results can come about], is the only hope we have of getting to know God. This is not easy and requires discipline, personal self-improvement to overcome our natural narcissistic tendencies and developing our capacity for objectivity. As we acquire more and more knowledge, we become more intimate with God and love develops.

האל הנכבד והנורא הזה--מצוה לאוהבו וליראה ממנו, שנאמר "ואהבת, את ה' אלוהיך

ונאמר "את ה' אלוהיך תירא

והיאך היא הדרך לאהבתו, ויראתו: בשעה שיתבונן האדם במעשיו וברואיו הנפלאים הגדולים, ויראה מהם חכמתו שאין לה ערך ולא קץ--מיד הוא אוהב ומשבח ומפאר ומתאווה תאווה גדולה לידע השם הגדול, כמו שאמר דויד "צמאה נפשי, לאלוהים--לאל חי"

(Hilchot Yesodei Hatorah 2:1)

Do we become one with knowledge by knowing the sum total of true beliefs or only a subset, like all true mathematical sentences? What about knowing the names of our children? Optional?

Medieval thinkers understood that knowledge becomes one with the mind and the mind with knowledge. We have a different understanding of how our brain works. However, we still believe that knowledge transforms the human mind from potentially knowing to in-actu knowing. That transformation is described as becoming one with knowledge. Maybe knowing the names of our children is not transformational, but knowing them certainly is.

Do you believe istakel beoraisa oobaraw almaw? [translation: He looked into the Torah and created the world]. Do you accept oraisa vehakadosh borachhoo chad hoo [translation: Torah and God are one] and ditto for yisrael veoraisa [translation: Yisrael and Torah are one]?

These quotes are Zoharic and like all Midrashim cannot be taken literally. These are concisely presented statements of medieval thinkers such as Ramban and Rambam, told in a metaphoric language and these contain a lot of thought in few words. Accepting the idea that Torah encompasses all knowledge [not only Halacha, as contemporary Yeshivot want us to believe], it is not far fetched when Torah is seen as God’s blueprint. It being God’s blueprint makes it one with God whose mind cannot be differentiated from His essence. Yisrael, the committed Torah learners, Torah in its broad sense of course, as they do what they are meant to do, become one with that knowledge. I know that readers will react by saying aren’t the “secular” scientists the ones who developed our understanding of our environment? How can you credit the Torah and those who learn it for the advances in science? The way I see it, myths of antiquity and idolatry and their followers, were a major barrier to open minded inquiry. When one can explain a phenomenon as magical, there is no further need to investigate; indeed investigation is dangerous as it might upset the magical powers that use their esoteric knowledge as tools of control. The core of Halachik Torah is the fight for the abolition of idolatry. The people that practice the Torah, in their human frailty, at times seem to be supporting and going in the wrong direction but then, every so often a person like Rambam appears on the scene and nudges us back onto the right path. It is only because of that partially successful fight against superstition and idolatry that western civilization, greatly influenced by the Judaic culture via its misguided offshoots, Islam and Christianity, made the strides that brought us modern science and empiricism.

In closing, I would like to explain my emphasis on the word “try”, conveying a tentative sense to our knowledge of God and His world and the importance of not deluding ourselves that we have all the answers or even some of them. In Mishlei 16:4-5 we read:

ד כֹּל פָּעַל יְהוָה, לַמַּעֲנֵהוּ; וְגַם-רָשָׁע, לְיוֹם רָעָה. 4

Each act of the Lord has its own end; even the wicked for an evil day.

Rambam in MN3:13 comments on this verse:

The words, " Each act of the Lord has its own end "express therefore the same idea as the following verse, "Everything that is called by my name: I have created it for my glory, I have formed it; yea, I have made it" (Isa. xliii. 7); that is to say, everything that is described as My work has been made by Me for the sake of My will and for no other purpose.

The idea is that in observing that what God made, a person contemplates His will. Lest a person think that he has apprehended God and His will in this contemplation, Shlomo Hamelech immediately warns us –

ה תּוֹעֲבַת יְהוָה, כָּל-גְּבַהּ-לֵב; יָד לְיָד, לֹא יִנָּקֶה. 5

Every one that is proud in heart is an abomination to the LORD; my hand upon it! he shall not be unpunished.

In other words, do not think and act with certainty based on that contemplation. Humans do not have the ability to really apprehend HKBH’s ways, they can try and as long as they are aware of their limitations, they can act with caution and humility. The certainty of the zealot is an abomination to HKBH.

Actions and Knowledge - Decision Making.

2010-11-22T05:13:00.002-05:00

Responding to my comments on the excellent blog Three Jews, Four opinions Evanston Jew posed a few questions which require a more thorough treatment than on a comment thread. Here are the first two: (I rearranged their sequence for clarity)

1. Knowledge=Chochma=wisdom= science= all the sciences +philosophy+ theology. You say in your second comment, "learning Torah encompasses all the sciences etc." Is encompasses the same as identical, and is knowledge, wisdom, science contained in or synonymous with Torah?

2. How can understanding the science of chemistry or evolution predict or give us a picture where the universe is headed. Are you referring to truths like one day the sun will implode or the universe will expand forever? Do you know where the universe is headed?

Let me do the Jewish thing and begin with a question; how does one know whether his or her next act is good or bad? We all agree that every action has a consequence whether trivial or momentous, so we would have to look at the outcome resulting from that act. As I get older and also more introspective, I can see how actions I took decades ago had consequences which I can tie in with specific decisions I made then. Some of those outcomes are good, others are pretty bad and it is clear that in those cases I could have done things differently for a different and better outcome. But even assessing now, so many years later, whether the outcome was good or bad is not so simple. The bad may be just a transition and as those who are affected by that decision continue on their path, we might find out that things evolved for the best and the same goes for the currently apparent good. In fact, many consequences of my actions may only become clear after I am long gone, maybe even a few generations down the road. As I look back on the things I did, the decisions I made, I have to say that all were pretty much like shooting darts in the dark. There was no real long-term impact assessment or study made before deciding. I based my decision on my instinct, my impulses, and my emotional state at the time and whatever logic I could muster up. Is there a way to improve our decision making so that it has the desired outcome in the long term? But what is the “desired” outcome? Isn’t that a problem too? Different people, based on their state of mind, culture, emotional state, personal bias and a slew of other factors will see different things as good and bad outcomes. Is there an objective criterion?

There really is no good answer to these questions because we are human and our perspective is very limited. But there are ways we can improve our decision-making and broaden our horizon. First, we have to define “good” and “bad” so that we can establish what a “desired” outcome is. Then we have to understand what the consequence of each action is. The most difficult task though is to understand ourselves and overcome our impulses and biases so that we can come to an objective conclusion rather that a subjectively self-indulging one. To achieve all this we need to acquire a lot of knowledge. We have to understand the world we live in, physics, chemistry, biology, sociology, psychology, mathematics and all the other sciences including metaphysics and theology that try to explain how things function in our world. It is only then that we can hope to develop an understanding of “good” and “bad”, desired outcome and the actions that will bring those about. Clearly, no one person, not even one generation of humankind can achieve all this in one lifetime. This requires years, civilizations, many peoples and trial and error.

Rambam tells us in Hilchot Yesodei Hatorah 4:13

ואני אומר שאין ראוי להיטייל בפרדס, אלא מי שנתמלא כרסו לחם

ובשר; ולחם ובשר זה, הוא לידע ביאור האסור והמותר וכיוצא בהן משאר המצוות.

ואף על פי שדברים אלו, דבר קטן קראו אותם חכמים, שהרי אמרו חכמים דבר גדול

מעשה מרכבה, ודבר קטן הוויה דאביי ורבא; אף על פי כן, ראויין הן להקדימן:

שהן מיישבין דעתו של אדם תחילה, ועוד שהן הטובה הגדולה שהשפיע הקדוש ברוך

הוא ליישוב העולם הזה, כדי לנחול חיי העולם הבא. ואפשר שיידעם הכול--גדול

וקטן, איש ואישה, בעל לב רחב ובעל לב קצר

Pardes are the sciences while Havayot דאביי ורבא are the rules of self-discipline in both action and thought that are the underlying reason of לידע ביאור האסור והמותר וכיוצא בהן משאר המצוות.

Rambam also tells us in Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:12 in a discussion on how one should organize the day and learn Torah and its various components והעניינות הנקראין פרדס, בכלל התלמוד. In other words Pardes, the sciences including metaphysics, are categorized as Talmud, as part of the core of the Mitzvah of Talmud Torah.

The purpose of acquiring all this knowledge and working on self-improvement is to try our best and I keep on emphasizing, “try our best”, to figure out how to act properly and responsibly and to assess “good” and “bad” objectively by understanding ourselves and our environment. This is the idea behind the Mitzvah of Vehalachta Biderachav – to follow in God’s path so poignantly and concisely expressed in Breishit 18:18-19

וְאַבְרָהָם--הָיוֹ יִהְיֶה לְגוֹי גָּדוֹל, וְעָצוּם; וְנִבְרְכוּ-בוֹ--כֹּל, גּוֹיֵי הָאָרֶץ.

Seeing that Abraham shall surely become a great and mighty nation and all the nations of the earth shall be blessed in him

כִּי יְדַעְתִּיו, לְמַעַן אֲשֶׁר יְצַוֶּה אֶת-בָּנָיו

וְאֶת-בֵּיתוֹ אַחֲרָיו, וְשָׁמְרוּ דֶּרֶךְ יְהוָה, לַעֲשׂוֹת צְדָקָה

וּמִשְׁפָּט--לְמַעַן, הָבִיא יְהוָה עַל-אַבְרָהָם, אֵת אֲשֶׁר-דִּבֶּר,

עָלָיו.

For I have known him, to the end that he may command his children and his household after him, that they may keep the way of the LORD, to do righteousness and justice; to the end that the LORD may bring upon Abraham that which He hath spoken of him.'

Avraham realized that to know what is the desired effect – “to the end that the LORD may bring upon Abraham that which He hath spoken of him” – he had to first figure out what to “keep the way of the LORD” means. The result of that contemplation was “to do righteousness and justice”. It is with that understanding that Avraham could foresee the outcome at Sdom. When Lot decided to move there the basis of his decision was very mundane – (Breishit 13:10)

י וַיִּשָּׂא-לוֹט אֶת-עֵינָיו, וַיַּרְא

אֶת-כָּל-כִּכַּר הַיַּרְדֵּן, כִּי כֻלָּהּ, מַשְׁקֶה--לִפְנֵי שַׁחֵת

יְהוָה, אֶת-סְדֹם וְאֶת-עֲמֹרָה, כְּגַן-יְהוָה כְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם,

בֹּאֲכָה צֹעַר.

10 And Lot lifted up his eyes, and beheld all the plain of the Jordan, that it was well watered every where, before the LORD destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah, like the garden of the LORD, like the land of Egypt, as one goes unto Tzoar.

I am sure there were signs of the upcoming destruction, as Sdom lies directly on a fault at the edge of a major tectonic plate there must have been earlier less devastating tremors etc… and Lot chose to ignore them because of the short-term gain he saw in the fertility of the land. The “desired outcome” that Lot was seeking was not in accord with Derech Hashem. It was a selfish and narcissistic short-term decision. Avraham on the other hand realized the mistake Lot made and Lot, a student of Avraham, came to that realization just in time to barely save his own skin. Lot’s earlier decisions to join Avraham show his conflicted personality and the imperfect decisions this brought about. It is those early decisions that resulted generations later in the two nations Amon and Mo’av.

So answering Evanston Jews questions, yes all knowledge that leads to our better understanding of our universe, world and society falls under the rubric of Talmud Torah as it helps in our acting responsibly for the long term. The Halachik part of the Torah is only one of the components of Talmud Torah albeit an important one, because it gives us the tools to assimilate the other knowledge and use it constructively. And yes, knowledge and information are crucial in our decision making and for us to know how to act. Does knowledge lead to perfect action, are we always right if we act with knowledge, of course not. We are human and the best we can do is try our best by getting to know as much as we can about ourselves and the world we live in.

I will address Evanston Jews other questions which are related to his first question in a follow up post as I have reached my self-imposed limit on posts lengths and have indulged in a little digressing to Parshanut.

The Paradox of Creationism and Non-Corporeality.

2010-11-15T04:49:00.000-05:00

Proving the existence of God is a topic discussed from time immemorial and seems to be a never-ending subject. I believe that the cause is the lack of definitions[1]. When we are trying to prove the existence of God, the thinking is that we are talking about a personal God, an entity that created and controls existence and is involved in it on a constant basis. That is the God that is relevant to the general public and is therefore the one that is instinctively sought after. Unfortunately, the only thing that we can prove unequivocally is the existence of a non-contingent entity that is uniquely non-contingent, non-physical and whose “existence” itself is only a term used for an entity that “exists” in an “existence” that we cannot fathom.

“…for even the term “existence” is applied to Him and other things, according to our opinion, only by way of absolute equivocation.” (MN 1:52, repeated in MN 1:35, 56 and 57.)

I say “Prove”, but I have to add a caveat even to this. Let me explain. Rambam in the introductory chapters to his discussion of the proofs for the existence of God presents the most common proofs, the ones used to this day, which are based on creation and referred to nowadays as “ID - Intelligent design” and which he vehemently rejects. Rambam explains that basing the existence of God on the argument that the world[2] must have a creator for it to be so magnificently structured is a very risky approach. He argues that there is no unequivocal proof that the world was created. It is only an argument that seems to be the most appealing and logical but cannot be proven incontrovertibly. Basing the existence of God on such a weak base is not a good idea. He therefore undertakes to prove it based on the possibility of an eternal universe too. He brings several proofs and one of the most compelling to me is the one arguing that in a world that we observe as being contingent, where every part of it is contingent on a preceding cause, there must be one entity that is non-contingent – that entity is what we call God[3]. In essence, he therefore shows that whether we believe in a created universe or an eternal one, there must be an entity, a “First Existent” that we refer to as God. The problem that we face is that the God that emerges from the eternal universe argument is necessarily uniquely non-contingent and therefore non- physical while the one that emerges from the creationist argument does not necessarily have to be non-physical and therefore uniqueness cannot be proven.

“The universe is either eternal or has had a beginning; if it had a beginning, there must necessarily exist a being which caused the beginning; this is clear to common sense; for a thing that has had a beginning, cannot be the cause of its own beginning, another must have caused it. The universe was therefore created by God. If on the other hand the universe were eternal, it could in various ways be proved that apart from the things which constitute the universe, there exists a being which is neither body nor a force in a body, and which is one, eternal, not preceded by any cause, and immutable. That being is God.” (MN 1:71)

Unity and non-corporeality can only be unequivocally proven if one assumes an eternal universe. A created universe can accept a non-corporeal unique God but it cannot be unequivocally proven. We therefore face a great paradox – accept creation – God does not have to be non-corporeal, accept eternity of the universe, God must be non-corporeal. We, Jews, who accept creation as a belief should therefore be able to live with the idea of a physical God. In fact, many great Jews did believe that God was corporeal. Ra’avad in Hilchot Teshuvah 3:7 makes the famous comment that “greater and better people [than Rambam who considers corporealists as minim] accepted that belief based on what they read in the scriptures and even more in the Aggadot that confuse thinking”.

It is with this in mind that I believe Hilchot Teshuvah 3:7 becomes clearer.

טו [ז] חמישה הן הנקראין מינים: האומר שאין שם אלוה, ואין לעולם מנהיג; והאומר שיש שם מנהיג, אבל הם שניים או יתר; והאומר שיש שם ריבון אחד, אלא שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה; וכן האומר שאינו לבדו ראשון וצור לכול; וכן העובד אלוה זולתו, כדי להיות מליץ בינו ובין ריבון העולמים. כל אחד מחמישה אלו מין.

The first of the five “Minim” must be read as one who accepts the existence of an entity such as God but does not accept Him as the entity responsible for natural law (מנהיג)[4]. An atheist, one who does not believe in the existence of God altogether, is not a Min – a religious definition. Denial of the existence of a “First Existent” is illogical because,

יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות, לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון

(Yesodei Hatorah 1:1)

The existence of a First Existent is a fact; it is the foundation and supporting column of all knowledge. In Hilchot Teshuvah, the Min rejects how our religion sees God and that places him in the category of Minim.

Micah Goodman in his excellent book “Secrets of the Guide for the Perplexed” (pg. 268-269) concludes that Rambam did not really believe that the existence of God is unequivocally provable[5]. I believe he erred by conflating the existence of God with “what” God is, an argument he himself makes several times in the discussion. True, the idea of a non-physical God is not provable; the existence of a First Existent is factual and provable. All the proofs that God is non-corporeal are based on the eternity of the universe which is not provable. The proofs for the existence of a First Existent are based on either possibilities; eternal or created universe.

[1] In a letter to Marseilles Rambam writes:

Know, my masters, that it is not proper for a man to accept as trustworthy anything other than one of these three things. The first is a thing for which there is a clear proof deriving from man's reasoning—such as arithmetic' geometry, and astronomy. The second is a thing that a man perceives through one of the five senses—such as when he knows with certainty that this is red and this is black and the like through the sight of his eye; or as when he tastes that this is bitter and this is sweet; or as when he feels that this is hot and this is cold; or as when he hears that this sound is clear and this sound is indistinct; or as when he smells that this is a pleasing smell and this is a displeasing smell and the like. The third is a thing that a man receives from the prophets or from the righteous. Every reasonable man ought to distinguish in his mind and thought all the things that he accepts as trustworthy, and say: "This I accept as trustworthy because of tradition, and this because of sense perception, and this on grounds of reason." Anyone who accepts as trustworthy anything that is not of these three species, of him it is said: "The simple believes everything" (Prov. 14:15).

[2] I use “world” for simplicity and clarity. I am really talking about physical existence.

[3] A variation on this proof is what is referred to as the metaphysical proof; all existents are “possible existents” – they are not necessary existent. In an eternal existence, there must be a time when no “possible existents” were in existence. As we are here, there must therefore exist a “necessary existent” who is God. This proof too is dependent on an eternal universe.

[4] Otherwise, the first should be counted as two. It is only after accepting the existence of God that a discussion can be held on His role in existence. Clearly שאין שם אלוה must be read as one with . ואין לעולם מנהיג

[5] He bases it on professor Ze’ev Harvey’s article ‘Maimonides” Avicennianism” Maimonidean Studies Vol 5 (2008).

Bein Adam Lamakom - Between Man and God.

2010-11-04T04:37:00.000-04:00

Mitzvot are generally categorized as Bein Adam Lacheveiro – laws directed towards living within society – and Bein Adam Lamakom – laws that deal with man’s relationship to God. The meaning of the latter – man’s relationship to God is seen in contemporary mainstream Jewish thought, as a form of worship whereby man satisfies God’s wishes and by doing so unleashes a flood of “good”. The simplistic see it as a kind of quid pro quo – I do for God and He reciprocates. The more sophisticated see it as a form of Tikkun - reparation; man’s ritualistic action somehow “repairs” the ruptures in the cosmos allowing for the flow of “good” to gush forth. There is thus a feeling of man being able to manipulate the divine and induce it to satisfy what man considers his needs, by performing rituals. This explains the dissonance we see where people act immorally and unethically while being very punctilious ritualistically. One can hurt fellow man as long as God is placated, nothing untoward will happen. In fact, the ritualistic non-punctilious injured party had it coming to him.

This has led to a religion of God in service of man. The Chassidim go to the Rebbes and Tzadikkim, the Yeshivish go to the “Gedolim” others go to the “Mekubalim” and other charlatans hoping that they have a better understanding of this manipulation, asking them to help and intercede. It has become anathema to doubt that this works; the doubters are seen as heretics who deny divine power and “Emunat Chachamim”. I, on the other hand, see it as a result of the Christianization of Judaism. As Professor Yeshayahu Leibowitz so sharply pointed out, the Christian god sacrificed his son Jesus to serve humankind while Avraham sacrificed his son to serve God. The Christian god serves man and promotes “love” and “faith”. That god can be mollified and manipulated so that he takes pity. On the other hand, the Jewish God demands that man worship Him the source of all knowledge and promotes Yediah – knowledge.

לה אַתָּה הָרְאֵתָ לָדַעַת, כִּי יְהוָה הוּא הָאֱלֹהִים: אֵין עוֹד, מִלְּבַדּוֹ.

You yourself were taught to know that Hashem is God; there is none besides Him.

In authentic Judaism, “faith” is replaced with knowledge. Furthermore, our God does not change His mind nor is He mollifiable, because He is perfect in His essence and does not need to adapt, change or improve for greater perfection.

Rambam takes the idea of Mitzvot Bein Adam Lamakom, one-step further.

“As is well known, all the commandments are divided into two groups: transgressions between man and his fellow man and transgressions between man and God…. For every commandment, whether it be a prescription or a prohibition, whose purpose is to bring about the achievement of a certain moral quality or of an opinion or the rightness of actions, which only concerns the individual himself and his becoming more perfect, is called by them a commandment dealing with the relation between man and God, even though in reality it sometimes may affect relations between man and his fellow man…. Note this.” (MN 3:35)

The definition of Bein Adam Lamakom is a Mitzvah that promotes self-improvement. When the Mitzvah does not obviously relate to fellow man it is categorized Bein Adam Lamakom. Man’s self-improvement is the path to follow if he wishes to relate to God. Self-improvement includes the moral, the ethical and the intellectual. The ritual of all Mitzvot has no intrinsic meaning other than changing the person performing them, whether it teaches self-control or promotes a belief. God is not, God forbid, affected by this ritual. It is man that through the changes the Mitzvah induces in him brings himself closer to God. As usual, when Rambam ends a statement with “Note this”, he signals an important point and shift from traditional thinking. This is one of the important teachings and radical changes that Rambam set out to share with us.

This comment was brought to my attention as I am reading an excellent new book that recently came out (in Hebrew), The Secrets of The Guide for the Perplexed by Micah Goodman available here

I will be writing more about this book and another I recently read (also Hebrew) Rambam by Moshe Halbertal available here .